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ABSTRACT 
 The corrections enterprise is wholly unprepared for mass casualty incidents 
(MCI). Prisons regularly experience incidents involving inmate violence; these events 
can quickly escalate into an MCI that overwhelms the prison’s ability to respond and 
overload local medical systems. Despite numerous prison-related disasters, the 
corrections enterprise remains disengaged from national emergency preparedness efforts. 
Further complicating the issue is the lack of corrections-specific emergency management 
doctrine to guide prison emergency planners toward achieving national preparedness 
goals. This thesis asks, “How can a framework be developed that will improve prison 
mass-casualty planning and response?” The first part of the research involves a gap 
analysis comparing the prescribed performance outcomes found in emergency 
management doctrine and MCI planning guides to the actual performance outcomes from 
several MCI events. In the second part, a panel of correctional and emergency 
management experts participated in a modified Delphi process to validate the results of 
the gap analysis using a discussion-based wargaming exercise. The research found that it 
is possible to create an accurate depiction of the problem space by reframing gap analysis 
data in the context of the prison operational environment. The resulting MCI framework 
recommends a series of corrections-specific planning actions, backed by doctrine, which 
is scalable and applicable to any prison or correctional facility. 
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While incarceration rates have been slowly declining over the last decade, some 
would argue that the prison construction boom of the 1980s and mid-1990s brought with it 
an increase in prison violence.1 Acts of inmate violence can quickly escalate, shifting from 
a routine prison disturbance to a multi-agency and even multi-jurisdictional response, 
mobilizing outside emergency medical responders, fire, and law enforcement agencies.  
During a 2009 riot at a prison in Chino, California, what started as an inmate fight 
rapidly evolved into burning building and several hours of combat; inmates armed with 
homemade weapons fought one another and prison staff for hours before prison staff 
regained control. Local and surrounding police and sheriff’s departments provided 
additional outside security while multiple fire and emergency medical service (EMS) 
agencies triaged and treated 195 injured inmates; another 55 inmates were transported to 
local hospitals.2 Similarly, in 2018 at South Carolina’s maximum-security Lee 
Correctional Institution, inmates in three housing units suddenly erupted into a seven-hour 
fight between gang members and responding staff. In addition to mobilizing guards from 
other state prisons, more than six outside agencies were called to provide security and 
medical support.3 Seven inmates died from likely “stabbing and slashing wounds” received 
from inmate-manufactured weapons, while 17 others were evacuated to outside hospitals.4 
More than 30 medical providers spent hours treating an untold number of inmates with 
                                                 
1 Steve Reilly, “Prison Violence Rises as Budgets Slashed,” USA Today, May 4, 2018, 
https://www.pressreader.com/usa/usa-today-us-edition/20180504/281547996517305; “California State 
Prisons—Chronology,” California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, accessed August 10, 
2017, http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Prisons/docs/CA-State-Prisons-chronology.pdf. 
2 “250 Inmates Hurt, 55 Hospitalized after California Prison Riot,” CNN, August 10, 2009, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2009/US/08/09/california.prison.riot/. 
3 Dwayne Mclemore and Teddy Kulmala, “7 Inmates Killed in ‘Mass Casualty Incident’ at SC 
Maximum Security Prison,” The State, April 16, 2018, https://www.thestate.com/news/local/crime/
article208982719.html. 
4 Mclemore and Kulmala. 
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less-severe injuries.5 Ongoing violence was reported to have been so severe that medical 
staff was delayed from entering and providing treatment for several hours.6  
The issue of prison preparedness goes beyond internal emergencies. In 2005, 
Hurricane Katrina flooded parts of New Orleans, leaving thousands of Orleans Parish 
Prison inmates trapped in their cells and with nowhere to go. Many languished in 
sometimes chest-deep water without access to food, clean drinking water, or toilet 
facilities.7 Without a plan or method for evacuation, inmates were forced to endure these 
inhumane conditions for weeks, eventually moving to a freeway overpass and then later to 
an already overcrowded facility. These events highlight not only the lack of overall prison 
emergency preparedness but also the vulnerability of this marginalized population and the 
potential for unnecessary suffering. In addition to overwhelming a prison’s own medical 
capacity, the effects of a prison mass-casualty incident (MCI) can reach far beyond prison 
walls. They can quickly overwhelm a community’s medical infrastructure, monopolizing 
all available EMS in the region and delaying life-saving emergency medical response to 
other areas. Despite incidents like these, prisons are systemically failing to plan for MCI 
events and other types of emergencies. 
While corrections is a crucial part of the criminal justice system and contributes to 
overall public safety, the role of corrections as a member of the homeland security 
enterprise is still largely undeveloped. Very little has been published to guide prisons 
toward national emergency management standards, leaving them unprepared for these 
multi-agency incidents. Federal Homeland Security agencies, such as the U.S. Fire 
Administration, have spearheaded the development of doctrinal planning guidance for the 
fire services and emergency medical disciplines while the corrections enterprise has no 
                                                 
5 “EMS Director Recalls Responding to Fatal Prison Riots,” EMS1, April 19, 2018, 
https://www.ems1.com/mass-casualty-incidents-mci/articles/380389048-EMS-director-recalls-responding-
to-fatal-prison-riots/. 
6 Mclemore and Kulmala, “7 Inmates Killed.” 
7 Ira P. Robbins, “Lessons from Hurricane Katrina: Prison Emergency Preparedness as a 
Constitutional Imperative,” University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 42, no. 1 (Fall 2008) 
(November 13, 2008): 1–69. 
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such federal counterpart. First responders, typically well versed in conducting a 
coordinated and unified response, may find themselves operationally constrained when 
there is no plan to overcome the physical and procedural barriers of a highly restricted 
environment such as a prison. Medical responders, who would otherwise immediately 
integrate into any other type of incident, are often instead kept at a distance. They face 
additional safety threats treating patients who, just moments earlier, were involved in hand-
to-hand combat with the intent to kill.  
This thesis asks the question, “How can a framework be developed that will 
improve prison mass-casualty planning and response?” This research bridges a critical 
planning gap in prison disaster planning, which protects the community and supports 
national homeland security goals. While there is an expectation of overall emergency 
preparedness across the corrections enterprise, very little exists to describe the threats for 
which prisons should prepare. Developing tools to improve prison emergency 
preparedness, whole-community planning, and coordination across agencies and 
disciplines supports national preparedness core capabilities and enhances prisons’ 
compliance with the National Incident Management System (NIMS). However, producing 
a successful prison MCI plan in the absence of threat-specific or prison-specific planning 
guidance is a high-risk proposition when the planners do not fully understand the 
operational environment or problem space. Providing prison emergency planners such as 
an MCI planning framework to address these issues will streamline their planning process, 
improve response, and protect the community. Furthermore, an organized response returns 
the emergency medical system to normal operating levels faster, preventing delays in life-
saving care elsewhere in the region.  
The research for this thesis was conducted in two parts: the first part identifies gaps 
in MCI planning and response by comparing the desired outcomes extrapolated from 
doctrinal sources to the actual performance outcomes of several MCI events. The limited-
availability correctional emergency management doctrine and incident documentation, 
when coupled with the lack of a strong government advocate to lead the development of 
such doctrine does in fact leave open a large doctrinal void with little to guide the 
corrections enterprise. In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, attacks, NIMS was 
xvi 
published with the intent of unifying emergency planning and response across disciplines. 
NIMS is not a plan; it provides the high-level concepts that guides strategic and operational 
planning across the homeland security enterprise, while the Incident Command System 
(ICS) provides the methods and frameworks for operational and tactical-level response. 
The universal theme of function jointly to build response capability echoes throughout 
these documents with the expectation that response agencies will gain an understanding of 
their partner agencies to improve local response. Similarly, it is incumbent upon 
correctional emergency managers to apply this doctrine to the operational environment 
with input from local planning partners. In comparing doctrine to actual outcomes, 
incidents that occurred in a secured facility or other constrained environment are especially 
of interest due to the similarities in how these types of incidents replicate the challenges 
first responders may experience when attempting to operate jointly within a correctional 
institution, impaired by both physical and operational security barriers. Analyzing these 
events revealed a series of planning and response issues ranging from site management and 
resource staging to gaps in communications and tactics. These issues, taken as a whole and 
framed in the context of the prison environment, generate an entirely new perspective on 
emergency planning and response.  
The second part of the research employs a modified Delphi technique to validate 
and refine the results of the gap analysis with a panel of corrections and emergency 
management subject matter experts. Panel members first participated in a survey to gauge 
their individual perceptions about prison emergency planning, followed by a discussion-
based military wargaming exercise. Panel members were presented with a case study 
involving interactive, fictional although credible, emergency response scenarios taking 
place at an actual prison familiar to the panel. Each phase of the MCI scenario presented 
several actions; panel members responded by describing their reactions to the crisis in 
terms of current plans and procedures. Participants faced operational constraints and likely 
planning gaps based on data collected from the gap analysis, representative of the types of 
issues they would likely encounter in a prison MCI. Throughout the discussion, panel 
members were asked follow-on questions about issues from the gap analysis and the 
feedback received from the initial survey. When the panel concurred that an issue was in 
xvii 
fact a planning gap or a problem, the facilitator would encourage a discussion of potential 
solutions in terms of policy, procedures, and tactics. The outcomes of the Delphi sessions 
provide the basis for the prison MCI planning framework.  
The process of developing this framework also produced several key findings. First, 
an accurate depiction of the problem space is critical when developing an emergency-
planning product such as a plan or framework. In the absence of sufficient prison-related 
data, the desired performance outcomes and lessons-learned data from non-prison MCI 
events can be applied to the correctional operational environment to create an accurate 
theoretical model. Employing a wargaming exercise with subject matter experts to gain 
their feedback and validate the accuracy of the model yields a list of correctional planning 
issues that forms this prison MCI planning framework. This process also reinforces the 
validity of the use of wargaming and exercises as planning tools to accurately test plans 
and assumptions, and develop response tactics.  
 As permanent, fixed locations, correctional facilities have the clear advantage of 
time; rather than rely entirely on the “just in time” features of ICS, these facilities have the 
ability to mirror the successful planning outcomes described in incidents such as the 2013 
Boston Marathon and “pre-script” their next disaster. Leading up to the 2013 incidents, the 
Boston planners developed a deep understanding of the problem space by reviewing 
information such as after actions reports from previous marathon events and testing their 
assumptions in a series of intensive multiagency wargaming exercises. Achieving this level 
of preparedness in the absence of a solid plan is no simple task. At the very least, the 
application of this framework can help these correctional organizations jump-start their 
MCI planning. In the long term, this will inevitably expose them to more elements of the 
doctrine and potentially lead to a doctrinally compliant system of policies, procedures, and 
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In 1998, the Atlantic reported that California’s state prison system was 40% larger 
than the federal prison system and was then estimated to be the largest prison system in the 
world.1 California’s prison construction boom of the 1980s and mid-1990s reflected a 
nationwide trend of building more facilities to meet the public’s demand for increased 
safety.2 Nationally, by the end of 2016, there was an estimated 6.5 million adults either in 
prison or under some form of correctional supervision.3  
While incarceration rates have been slowly declining over the last decade, some 
would argue that this growth also brought with it an increase in prison violence.4 South 
Carolina’s Lee Correctional Institution is a maximum-security prison that has experienced 
several incidents involving guards taken hostage or retaking the prison by force from 
rioting inmates.5 In 2018, three housing units suddenly erupted into a seven-hour fight 
between gang members and responding staff; in addition to mobilizing guards from other 
state prisons, more than six outside agencies were called to provide security and medical 
support.6 Seven inmates died from likely “stabbing and slashing wounds” received from 
inmate manufactured weapons, while 17 others were evacuated to outside hospitals.7 More 
than 30 medical providers spent hours treating an untold number of inmates with less 
                                                 
1 Eric Schlosser, “The Prison-Industrial Complex,” The Atlantic, December 1998, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1998/12/the-prison-industrial-complex/304669/. 
2 “California State Prisons—Chronology,” California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 
accessed August 10, 2017, http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Prisons/docs/CA-State-Prisons-chronology.pdf. 
3 Danielle Kaeble and Mary Cowhig, Correctional Populations in the United States, 2016, NCJ 
251211 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 2016), 1. 
4 Steve Reilly, “Prison Violence Rises as Budgets Slashed,” USA Today, May 4, 2018, 
https://www.pressreader.com/usa/usa-today-us-edition/20180504/281547996517305. 
5 Dwayne Mclemore and Teddy Kulmala, “7 Inmates Killed in ‘Mass Casualty Incident’ at SC 
Maximum Security Prison,” The State, April 16, 2018, https://www.thestate.com/news/local/crime/
article208982719.html. 
6 Mclemore and Kulmala. 
7 Mclemore and Kulmala. 
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severe injuries.8 The ongoing violence was reported to have been so severe that medical 
staff was delayed from entering and providing treatment for several hours.9  
Not all prison disturbances last hours; many are over in just minutes. At a California 
prison in 2015, a 20-minute melee involving an estimated seventy inmates ended with one 
inmate dead and 11 inmates transported to surrounding hospitals.10 The threat may have 
ended quickly; however, the medical response to follow did not, as prison medical staff 
and the many responding emergency medical service (EMS) providers from adjoining 
counties provided on-site treatment to numerous injured inmates.11 
As these examples demonstrate, events of this magnitude immediately shift from a 
prison disturbance to a multi-agency and even multi-jurisdictional response, mobilizing 
outside emergency medical responders, fire, and law enforcement agencies. Additionally, 
local hospitals may be impacted by a prison mass-casualty incident (MCI), which has 
cascading implications for daily operations. While the correctional enterprise overall has 
reached parity with law enforcement in terms of size, the role of corrections as a response 
partner has not been fully actualized. The National Incident Management System (NIMS) 
is the nationally recognized and adopted doctrine of emergency planning and response, 
providing the public safety community with the guidelines and frameworks to plan jointly 
and carry out a unified response.12 While this adoption of NIMS has reshaped the 
emergency management landscape and unified federal, state, and local planning efforts, 
some would say that more needs to be done to prepare and guide the corrections enterprise 
for these types of events. 
                                                 
8 “EMS Director Recalls Responding to Fatal Prison Riots,” EMS1, April 19, 2018, 
https://www.ems1.com/mass-casualty-incidents-mci/articles/380389048-EMS-director-recalls-responding-
to-fatal-prison-riots/. 
9 Mclemore and Kulmala, “7 Inmates Killed.” 
10 Sam Stanton and Richard Chang, “Notorious Member of ‘San Quentin Six’ Killed in New Folsom 
Prison Riot,” Sacramento Bee, August 12, 2015, https://www.sacbee.com/news/local/crime/
article30940113.html. 
11 Stanton and Chang. 
12 Department of Homeland Security, National Response Framework, 3rd ed. (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, 2016), 3. 
 
3 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
MCIs are an unfortunate reality but one that first responders are generally well 
prepared to handle. Whether it is for a multi-car accident, an overturned bus, or a collapsed 
structure, police, fire, and EMS responders from surrounding jurisdictions assemble on 
scene, quickly organizing and managing the incident through the application of emergency 
management and MCI doctrine. Regardless of whether these agencies have worked 
together previously or are meeting for the first time, they still form an ad-hoc management 
structure under the Incident Command System (ICS), triage and sort patients, and direct 
the flow of emergency resources. Training materials and professional journals that offer 
advice on MCI management best practices typically imply a best-case scenario, suggesting 
that an open or unrestricted parking lot or stretch of highway will always be available to 
stage resources. This often-formulaic set of planning considerations forms the bulk of MCI 
planning and response doctrine, unencumbered by space or terrain restrictions.  
In reality, not all MCI events are this predictable or easy to maneuver. Incidents 
that occur in a highly restrictive environment, such as a prison, military base, or office 
building, present multiple barriers that can physically prevent responders from conducting 
a coordinated, unified response. The problem is especially serious in prisons, where a riot 
can quickly escalate to an MCI and overwhelm a prison’s medical capacity. By design, 
prisons keep the public and dangerous contraband out―and inmates contained inside. 
Medical responders, who would otherwise be immediately integrated into an incident, are 
kept at a distance by multiple layers of security and safety protocols; inside movement is 
carefully controlled, and exterior access points are heavily scrutinized. Further 
exacerbating the crisis is the fact that nearly every patient is a convicted criminal, possibly 
with a history of violence. Responders face additional safety threats treating patients who, 
just moments earlier, were involved in hand-to-hand combat with homemade slashing and 
stabbing weapons used with the intent to kill. A prisoner’s need for treatment may not deter 
their desire to act violently.  
Prisons regularly experience incidents involving inmate violence, and any one of 
these incidents can quickly escalate, becoming prolonged riots that result in high numbers 
of serious injuries. At a California prison in 2009, an eleven-hour incident resulted in more 
 
4 
than 250 injured inmates, 55 of whom required transport by ambulance and 
hospitalization.13 Despite incidents like this, prisons are systemically failing to plan for 
MCI events and other types of emergencies. In her 2013 study, Melissa Savilonis found 
most prisons to be lacking a satisfactory emergency management program, leaving them 
vastly unprepared for the wide range of natural and man-made disasters that could affect 
them.14 These major medical events can overwhelm the community’s medical 
infrastructure, potentially monopolize all available EMSs in the region, and delay life-
saving emergency medical response to other areas.  
The issue of prison preparedness goes beyond internal emergencies. In 2005, 
Hurricane Katrina battered the Gulf Coast, causing a surge of storm water to overtop levees 
and flood parts of New Orleans. Trapped in their cells and with nowhere to go, thousands 
of Orleans Parish Prison inmates languished in sometimes chest-deep water without access 
to food, clean drinking water, or toilet facilities.15 Without a plan or method for evacuation, 
these inhumane conditions persisted for weeks as inmates were eventually moved to a 
freeway overpass by a handful of armed guards, and then later to an already overcrowded 
facility. This event highlights not only the lack of overall prison emergency preparedness 
but also the vulnerability of a population that is largely ignored.16 In his article published 
by American University’s Washington College of Law, Ira Robbins discusses these issues 
from Hurricane Katrina and asserts that prison emergency preparedness is a constitutional 
imperative.17 He cites the United Nations as well as international human rights law as the 
standard-bearers for ethical treatment of prisoners, insisting that even the extraordinary 
                                                 
13 “250 Inmates Hurt, 55 Hospitalized after California Prison Riot,” CNN, August 10, 2009, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2009/US/08/09/california.prison.riot/. 
14 Melissa A. Savilonis, “Prisons and Disasters” (PhD thesis, Northeastern University, 2013), 
https://nicic.gov/library/012503. 
15 Ira P. Robbins, “Lessons from Hurricane Katrina: Prison Emergency Preparedness as a 
Constitutional Imperative,” University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 42, no. 1 (Fall 2008) 
(November 13, 2008): 1–69. 
16 Robbins, 2. 
17 Robbins, 1. 
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circumstances presented by a catastrophic event do not allow for human rights abuses.18 
Robbins even goes so far as to say that inadequate emergency plans also present a threat to 
the community.19  
The Savilonis study on prison emergency preparedness also found a systemic 
failure across correctional agencies to plan for major emergencies.20 She observes that pets 
in America fare far better in emergencies than inmates, emphasizing not only a lack of 
planning but also a lack of concern for this marginalized population.21 In light of these 
deficiencies, Savilonis advocates for federal reform, Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA) oversight, or at the very least, for federal guidance and standards for 
prison and jail emergency plans.22 She suggests that FEMA’s coordinating role during the 
disaster management cycle (mitigation, preparedness, response, recovery) extends to 
prisons as well. Savilonis echoes Robbins’s assertions as to the prison’s responsibilities in 
regard to inmate welfare during emergencies. She states, “Prisons are legally responsible 
for the welfare of prisoners,” and that as wards of the state it is the state’s duty to protect 
them from “preventable harm.”23 These two authors confirm both a lack of federal 
emergency planning guidance for prisons as well as a systemic failure to plan; bolstering 
the argument for prison planning frameworks, citing both legal and moral justifications as 
well as the potential effects on public safety. 
Corrections are a crucial part of the criminal justice system and contribute to overall 
public safety; however, the role of corrections as a member of the homeland security 
enterprise is still largely undeveloped. As both the Savilonis and Robbins studies have 
confirmed, very little has been published to guide prisons toward national emergency 
                                                 
18 Robbins, 5. 
19 Robbins, 19. 
20 Savilonis, “Prisons and Disasters,” 11. 
21 Savilonis, 17. 
22 Savilonis, 67. 
23 Savilonis, 12. 
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management standards. Among the few prison emergency-planning topics that are 
documented, federal planning guidance for prison MCIs is almost entirely unexplored, 
which leaves a wide gap in planning coverage. The application of just-in-time, ad-hoc 
organizational models such as ICS still falls short when there is no plan to overcome the 
physical and procedural barriers of a highly restricted environment.  
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THESIS RESEARCH 
This research bridges a critical planning gap in prison disaster planning. After the 
September 11 attacks (9/11), the renewed emphasis on governance and oversight of the 
nation’s emergency management system brought with it a host of standardized doctrine, 
systems, and frameworks with the intent of preparing communities, unifying response 
disciplines, and improving planning and response at all levels of government. In addition 
to law enforcement and the fire service, FEMA produced discipline-specific federal 
guidance to assist public works, schools, hospitals, and even the military with integrating 
and operating jointly as a member of the response community. As other studies have 
shown, these federal efforts excluded the corrections enterprise and no such federal 
documents exist. Some suggest that corrections are viewed as “self-sufficient and unlikely 
to suffer damages,” despite the number of serious incidents that contradict this line of 
thinking.24 Disasters that affect a prison will nearly always be multi-agency events, 
precisely for which these FEMA guidelines were designed.  
Improving prison MCI preparedness protects the community and supports national 
homeland security goals. The Department of Homeland Security’s National Preparedness 
Goal outlines several critical core capabilities that serve as both guidelines and goals for 
response agencies.25 Developing tools to improve emergency preparedness, whole 
community planning, and coordination across agencies and disciplines supports these 
national preparedness core capabilities and enhances prison’s compliance with NIMS. 
Providing prison emergency planners an MCI planning framework could streamline the 
                                                 
24 Savilonis, 25. 
25 Department of Homeland Security, National Preparedness Goal, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, 2015), 3. 
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planning process, improve response, and return the emergency medical system to normal 
operating levels faster. This will not only save lives at the scene of the incident but also 
prevent delays in life-saving care elsewhere in the region.  
This research aims to solve a planning gap in one of the nation’s largest prison 
systems. Although reforms in inmate rehabilitation and declining crime rates are slowly 
reducing the prison population overall, the California Department of Corrections and 
Rehabilitation (CDCR) remains one of the top three largest correctional systems in the 
United States.26 CDCR is formally considering the results of this research to improve its 
own MCI planning, potentially affecting communities across the state.  
In addition to statewide implementation, this research also has the potential to 
improve prison MCI planning and response across the corrections enterprise. As a national 
leader in corrections, the CDCR frequently hosts correctional leadership from other states 
and even other countries to exchange ideas, innovations, and lessons learned to improve 
the profession and enhance public safety. The CDCR also collaborates with the National 
Institute of Corrections (NIC) on a variety of correctional topics. In additional to being a 
federal agency, the NIC serves as both an educator and information clearinghouse on a 
wide range of corrections topics. The NIC library currently contains only one jail 
emergency planning guide that includes discussions of leadership and management topics, 
and provides an emergency plan-auditing tool.27 On the topic of mass-casualty planning, 
this emergency planning guide simply asks, “Does the plan include mass casualties/
triage?”28 While an inventory of potential plans is a helpful starting point, in the 10 years 
since its publication there have been no follow-on publications to suggest how to make 
those plans or to what end should those plans accomplish. This MCI planning framework 
                                                 
26 E. Ann Carson, “Prisoners in 2015” (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, December 
2016), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p15.pdf.  
27 Jeffrey A. Schwartz and Cynthia Barry, A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Jail 
Emergencies (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 2009). 
28 Schwartz and Barry, 110. 
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is a tool that is applicable to any correctional facility, jail, or prison; institutions such as the 
NIC may consider promulgation to correctional agencies across the nation. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTION 
Similar to a framework in the physical sense that serves as the skeleton that supports 
and holds together a building or physical structure, a framework is a conceptual structure 
that follows a given set of rules, limits, or policies to guide decision-making or to solve a 
problem. A framework provides a starting point as well as the boundaries, while still 
allowing for additions within the established limits. A planning framework provides a 
series of considerations for prison emergency planners to address when developing a prison 
MCI plan that satisfies doctrinal and operational requirements.  
This thesis conducts an analysis of emergency management and MCI doctrine, after 
action reports from mass-casualty events, federal documents, active-shooter incidents, 
prison incidents, and other related data to both validate the need for and develop a prison 
MCI planning framework. The specific research question addressed is: How can a 
framework be developed that will improve prison mass-casualty planning and response? 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This review examines federal emergency management doctrine, legal and policy 
analyses, emergency services professional journals, and federal white papers on MCI best 
practices.  
The emergency management discipline is highly structured and deeply developed, 
providing a wealth of materials on general emergency planning and response practices. 
Public safety disciplines such as law enforcement, fire, and EMSs have further enhanced 
the enterprise with discipline-specific doctrine. With a lack of contributions from 
corrections discipline, the topic of prison mass-casualty planning is wholly unaddressed.  
A majority of the scholarly documents available about MCI events center on trauma 
care and the management of medical resources. Active shooter incidents and post-9/11 
concerns of improvised chemical and explosive terror attacks generated numerous articles 
on hospital and community planning, and medical organizations have convened 
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conferences to review studies and issue formal recommendations for reducing patient 
mortality from specific types of injuries.29 While the anticipated chemical attacks never 
quite manifested, concerns over the vulnerability of the public when attending mass 
gathering events and the apparent increase in active shooter incidents prompted the federal 
government to issue additional planning guides to prepare for and respond to such 
threats.30 These federal planning documents form the bulk of MCI-specific planning and 
response doctrine.  
In order to extract the information necessary to develop prison-specific 
recommendations and bridge this planning gap, it is necessary to examine the doctrine that 
guides general emergency planning and response practices and academic research specific 
to the gaps and failures in prison emergency planning. FEMA has published numerous 
white papers about lessons learned and best practices following various MCI events, and 
professional publications such as the Journal of Emergency Medical Services provide their 
commentary.  
1. Mass Casualty and Emergency Management Doctrine 
Merriam-Webster defines doctrine as both “something that is taught” and a “body 
of principles in a branch of knowledge or system of belief.”31 FEMA adds that doctrine is 
an organization’s beliefs “about the best (or right) way to do things” and “reflects the 
culture of an organization.”32 FEMA serves as the source of federal emergency 
management doctrine, providing the emergency management discipline with the 
                                                 
29 Lenworth M. Jacobs et al., “Joint Committee to Create a National Policy to Enhance Survivability 
from Mass Casualty Shooting Events: Hartford Consensus II,” Connecticut Medicine 218, no. 1 (March 
2014): 476–78. 
30 U.S. Fire Administration, Fire/Emergency Medical Services Department Operational 
Considerations and Guide for Active Shooter and Mass Casualty Incidents (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, 2013), https://www.usfa.fema.gov/downloads/pdf/publications/
active_shooter_guide.pdf. 
31 “Doctrine,” in Merriam-Webster, accessed July 21, 2018, https://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/doctrine. 
32 Federal Emergency Management Agency, IS-822: Fundamentals of Management and Support 




frameworks, systems, and methods to plan for, respond to, and recover from emergencies. 
FEMA also “encourages states and localities to develop comprehensive disaster 
preparedness plans”33  
Federal doctrine is promulgated through a library of interconnected and 
complimentary documents that links emergency management from the federal to the local 
levels. The National Response Framework (NRF) is the “mother” document of our nation’s 
emergency management system, outlining strategic-level, core capabilities that include 
emergency response.34 Emergency management capabilities and systems are prescribed in 
further detail under NIMS, which provides all levels of government with the operational 
frameworks and organizational structures. Born of the lessons learned responding to the 9/
11 terrorist attacks and first published in 2004, NIMS brought standardization and 
continuity across the homeland security enterprise. NIMS provides the emergency 
management discipline with a systematic approach that guides “command and coordination 
of incidents, resource management, and information management.”35 Together these 
documents link the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of planning, response, and 
governance, guiding how the response community works together in incidents ranging 
“from traffic accidents to major disasters.”36  
Despite the existence of this extensive body of knowledge that guides states, 
communities, and public safety agencies in the development and maintenance of their 
preparedness and response plans, the corrections enterprise has somehow been absent from 
these efforts. While NIMS prescribes a whole community approach, that community 
appears to have forgotten about their jails and prisons.37 Few would argue against the 
                                                 
33 Federal Emergency Management Agency. “About the Agency,” accessed August 18, 2018, 
https://www.fema.gov/about-agency. 
34 Department of Homeland Security, National Response Framework, 21. 
35 Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Incident Management System, 3rd ed. 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2017), 2. 
36 Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1. 
37 Savilonis, “Prisons and Disasters,” 15. 
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government’s responsibility to protect the inmates under their care, and the operational 
constraints of a disaster certainly does not waive this obligation.38 Despite this obligation, 
several documented occurrences of disasters necessitating a jail or prison evacuation that 
found officials unprepared presents a dire and recurring pattern of neglect. In addition to 
the Orleans Parish Prison incident that left thousands of inmates trapped and suffering 
following the arrival of Hurricane Katrina, a similar incident occurred in Texas in 2008. 
With Hurricane Ike approaching Galveston County, Texas, county officials ordered a 
mandatory evacuation for the public; the jail, however, sheltered in place despite severe 
weather warnings. The resulting investigations and lawsuits describe experiences and 
circumstance similar to the Orleans Parish incident.39 Numerous studies of these and other 
prison incidents have shown untrained staff and a lack of emergency plans.40 Robbins 
agrees with these findings, highlighting an NIC study that found an overall lack of 
emergency training and exercise across the corrections enterprise.41  
Some would argue that the federal government’s failure to address issues specific 
to prison emergency preparedness and a lack of federal oversight has led to the current 
gaps. However, these doctrinal publications issued by FEMA are considered guidance, as 
their adoption by states is voluntary. Savilonis contends that despite this abundance of 
structured doctrine, the federal government’s role in coordinating national planning efforts 
should include prisons and asserts that federal enforcement or oversight is required.42 
Robbins, too, suggests federal intervention; however, past federal efforts to force state 
adoption of federal programs through legislation is historically fraught with legal 
challenges over federal power and states’ constitutional rights.43 Rather than compel states 
                                                 
38 Robbins, “Lessons from Hurricane Katrina,” 4. 
39 Savilonis, “Prisons and Disasters,” 20. 
40 Savilonis, 14. 
41 Robbins, “Lessons from Hurricane Katrina,” 16. 
42 Savilonis, “Prisons and Disasters,” 12. 
43 Robbins, “Lessons from Hurricane Katrina,” 60. 
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to adopt NIMS through legislation, the receipt of federal funds for many disaster-related 
programs are instead contingent on states’ NIMS compliance.44  
And while correct that NIMS does not specifically address prison issues or provide 
specific details for managing prison emergencies, NIMS does not explain to the local fire 
department how to fight a fire, either. As FEMA explains within the doctrine itself, NIMS 
“is not a response plan” but rather a “systematic approach to incident management.”45 It 
is the role of the emergency planner to apply these tools and systems and for responders to 
operate within the framework; the planning efforts prescribed by NIMS facilitates the 
interface of disparate disciplines so they may function efficiently in times of crisis.46 
Some discipline-specific doctrine does exist. In response to numerous mass-
casualty and active-shooter events, FEMA convened multiple expert panels from the 
nation’s leading EMS and medical organizations; they reviewed the existing literature on 
MCI events, which primarily consisted of after action reports and emergency plans, and 
they attempted to formulate a base document for promulgation to the field. The panels 
found a “lack of systematic mandatory inclusion of all EMS provider types in State, 
regional, and local emergency plans,” concluding that further work was needed to develop 
a comprehensive national strategy.47 The resulting operational template that FEMA 
released in 2012 was one of its first official planning guides to the EMS community.48 The 
following year, FEMA released Fire/EMS Department Operational Considerations and 
Guide for Active Shooter and Mass Casualty Incidents, which directly addresses many 
                                                 
44 Robbins, 60. 
45 Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Incident Management System, 2; “NIMS 
Frequently Asked Questions,” Federal Emergency Management Agency, accessed August 18, 2018, 
https://www.fema.gov/nims-frequently-asked-questions. 
46 Department of Homeland Security, National Response Framework. 
47 U.S. Fire Administration, Federal Emergency Management Agency, and U.S. Fire Administration, 
Operational Templates and Guidance for EMS Mass Incident Deployment (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, 2012), 1. 




lessons learned from active-shooter incidents that the previous document was lacking.49 
Generally, these discipline-specific documents still defer back to the frameworks and 
systems found in doctrine, highlighting that their foundations are NIMS and ICS and as 
such, recommend following the federal doctrinal principles.  
While these documents are mostly based on the existing systems and frameworks, 
they do provide some updated theory on MCI response. For example, the after action 
reports from previous active-shooter events suggested that the operational environment for 
unarmed first-responders such as fire and EMS have grown increasingly more hazardous; 
however, this latest guide contradicts that assertion, stating “research and history have 
indicated that the active risk at most incidents is over before first responders arrive on 
scene, or shortly thereafter.”50  
2. Proper Resource Staging and Scene Management  
The available literature on MCIs suggests that managing the incident site and 
facilitating the efficient movement of responders and resources can be as important as 
managing the disaster itself. Following a well-publicized fire incident in 2003, FEMA 
issued a white paper detailing the issues and lessons learned surrounding site 
management.51 In this particular incident, the first responders to arrive on-scene had 
neglected to perform several actions related to site management; the resulting gridlock 
nearly halted emergency vehicle movement.52 Recognizing the potentially tragic 
consequences of not acting, a medical responder organized the scene and prevented further 
delays.53 FEMA’s emphasis of this topic highlights not only the importance of this issue 
but also the existence of planning and training gaps.  
                                                 
49 U.S. Fire Administration, Operational Considerations. 
50 U.S. Fire Administration, 4. 
51 NOAA U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Mass Casualty Incidents: Establishing a Staging 
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 Professional journals often offer their perspective on issues from the field; the 
Journal of Emergency Medical Services (JEMS) has published at least three articles about 
the importance of proper resource staging, complementing FEMA’s MCI guidance. 
According to A. J. Heightman, a veteran EMS director and editor-in-chief of JEMS, “Mass-
casualty incidents (MCls) are possibly the most demanding and chaotic events a responder 
will ever be confronted with.”54 He describes the site management issues as easily 
neglected and most likely forgotten, which accurately describes the 2003 fire incident. In 
the rush to deliver emergency medical care while stabilizing the incident, vehicle staging 
competes with incident communications as the issue most likely to fail―and frequently it 
does.55 Whether it is an MCI or a pre-planned event, Heightman asserts that managing 
vehicle staging and the flow of responder vehicles through the incident site should be 
approached with the same organization and efficiency as the morning drop-off at an 
elementary school.56 This carefully orchestrated movement of vehicles alleviates 
confusion, congestion, and most importantly, delivers care as efficiently as possible; this 
is especially critical in an MCI event, where seconds count. Heightman calls this “one of 
the most essential principals of mass casualty incident (MCI) management.”57 
Just as Savilonis reports a total lack of prison-specific planning guidance, these 
documents represent a starting a point for the medical response community. Until a 
definitive national strategy document is produced that provides the appropriate level of 
detail, planners and responders will continue to look to professional journals for the latest 
lessons learned and timely analysis of major events.  
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While emergency management doctrine provides a standardized structure and 
systems for public safety disciplines to operate together, the federal guidance and direction 
for applying these systems to the corrections enterprise is entirely lacking. From the 
literature review it is clear that in multi-agency events, managing the incident site, staging 
and organizing responders, and directing the flow of resources into and through the incident 
site are critical issues and recurring problems. It quickly becomes apparent that the logistics 
of managing an MCI event is almost equally important as the delivery of emergency 
medical care. 
For an organization like a prison, which may experience a major event and suddenly 
need to interface with the emergency medical system and other allied response agencies, 
planning and preparedness are no less important, yet very little has been published on 
prison emergency management or prison MCI events. The failure to plan not only threatens 
the safety of the public but also may lead to abuses and violations of an inmate’s right to 
proper care and protection from harm. This issue goes beyond safety. As both Savilonis 
and Robbins agree, it is also about protecting the vulnerable and under-represented 
members of society―which is part of our moral code.  
E. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
The research for this thesis was conducted in two parts: the first part identifies gaps 
in MCI planning and response by comparing doctrine to the actual performance outcomes 
of several MCI events. The second part of the research employed a modified Delphi 
technique to refine the gap analysis data with a panel of correctional experts. The outcomes 
of the Delphi sessions validate the gap analysis data and provide the basis for the proposed 
prison MCI planning framework.  
1. Gap Analysis 
This gap analysis draws from methodologies such as Mager and Pipe’s 
Performance Analysis Model and Gilbert’s Performance Engineering Model, both of 
which prescribe methods for identifying appropriate strategies for correcting deficient 
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performance.58 In its simplest form, a gap analysis examines the actual performance 
outcomes and compares them to the desired performance outcomes, then analyzes the 
causes of the performance deficiencies in order to determine an appropriate method of 
correction. The identification and emphasis of these particular performance issues found 
in case studies, professional journals, and after action reports answers the primary question 
that both of these methods ask, “Is this task important?”59 Mager and Pipe primarily focus 
on the performance and actions of the individual, but also inquires as to the organizational 
roadblocks that are preventing optimal performance.60 Gilbert on the other hand examines 
collective performance, viewing problems from the policy, strategic, and tactical levels.61 
This analysis borrows from both models; the goal of this gap analysis is to offer 
organizational recommendations such as training or policies as well as tactical 
considerations to improve prison MCI response.  
Determining the performance baseline or the specific criteria for an optimal prison 
MCI response presents several challenges. As discussed in the literature review, the 
corrections enterprise generally lacks useable performance data or incident records that 
accurately describe specific planning and response issues in sufficient detail to create 
adequate plans. Direct observation of performance is simply not possible without actual 
incidents readily available, and conducting multiple full-scale exercises for the purpose of 
observation is resource prohibitive. Additionally, training exercises may not accurately 
reflect behavior during an actual crisis. Federal guidelines or performance standards for 
non-prison MCI events are very generalized, which speaks to the doctrine’s flexible nature, 
and situation-specific planning templates for pre-planned mass gatherings do not include 
secured facilities.62 As the national authority on emergency response, FEMA’s 
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foundational MCI planning document is merely a starting a point in working toward 
improving response, synthesized from a cross-section of policies and best practices from 
across the nation.63 FEMA admits that a national policy has yet to be developed that fully 
details the elements of a successful MCI response. National policy is an ambitious goal, 
considering that an MCI can occur in virtually any environment and involve limitless 
combinations of humans, hazards, and injuries.64 However, even in the absence of prison 
incident data or an active incident to test the baseline, the application of existing data from 
non-prison incidents to the problem space yields substantial data. An analysis of FEMA’s 
best practices, after action reports and case studies from MCI incidents, professional 
journals, and their commentary of lessons learned presents a thorough list of performance 
issues and planning challenges when examined as a whole. By using these data to 
extrapolate a performance baseline and viewing it through the lens of planning for a prison 
MCI, the beginnings of a planning framework start to manifest.  
The institutionalized process of producing after action reports and documenting 
post-incident lessons learned are the hallmark of a learning organization and contribute 
greatly to improving the emergency management enterprise. An analysis of incident after 
action reports, in addition to the doctrinal sources referenced in the literature review, active 
shooter incidents, MCI case studies, and professional journals reveal many critical planning 
and response issues repeated multiple times across the country and spanning the decade. 
Issues involving a secured facility are especially of interest because in many ways these 
types of incidents replicate some of the challenges correctional institutions may experience 
when attempting to operate jointly in an environment separated by both physical and 
operational security barriers. 
This study involves an analysis of emergency management doctrine comprising of 
federal planning documents to identify the set of activities and procedures that form the 
basis for optimal performance in an MCI event. Incidents that occurred in highly restrictive 
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environments have shown some similarities to prisons, including physical security 
measures that prevent first responders from entering a building and disparities in 
operational procedures that hamper a unified response. After action reports and studies of 
actual incidents also provide details of best practices that validated the doctrine and further 
defined optimal performance. These are useful in identifying planning requirements for the 
restrictive environments of prisons; identifying these trends in less-than-optimal 
performance and comparing them to an ideal response presents the overall planning gap.  
Two categories of MCIs specifically excluded from this thesis are catastrophic 
natural disasters and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) events. Many 
sources outside of the United States use the term mass-casualty incident to describe a 
national incident, such as a major earthquake, that in addition to producing a high volume 
of casualties is also accompanied by a catastrophic loss of infrastructure. The loss of roads, 
hospitals, and utilities hampers response and delays care, which further contributes to the 
national death toll. It is important to make the distinction that this thesis assumes a localized 
event with fully functioning medical and transportation infrastructure. Similarly, while 
CBRN events produce many casualties and are closely associated with MCIs, the typical 
CBRN response involves a patient decontamination operation, which is not germane to the 
topic at hand or the solutions pursued.  
2. Framework Development 
In the second phase of the research, a case study was conducted using a discussion-
based “wargaming” exercise following a process similar to that used by planners of the 
Boston Marathon. The New England Journal of Medicine reported that in recent years 
public safety officials in Boston engaged in a planning process from the perspective of it 
being a “planned mass-casualty event.”65 This unique perspective helped them anticipate 
many potential problems in advance and is credited with a highly successful outcome 
during the 2013 bombing incident. While they had the clear advantage of being able to pre-
                                                 
65 Paul D. Biddinger et al., “Be Prepared—The Boston Marathon and Mass-Casualty Events,” New 




stage a certain amount of medical and law enforcement resources, the value of the planning 
process should not be overlooked. Despite this perceived advantage, responders had a 26-
mile route to contend with as well as large crowds, restricted travel routes, and the usual if 
not excessive amount of daily emergency calls. By drawing on lessons learned from prior 
years, the Boston Marathon planners were essentially conducting an annual gap analysis to 
build on noted successes and jointly develop solutions prior to the next event. Other sources 
have discussed considerations for pre-planning as well, especially for fixed locations such 
as schools or stadiums. Heightman even goes so far as to suggest that mass-gathering 
venues pre-position a cache of MCI supplies, beyond just the color-coded tarps and patient 
triage tags that Heightman suggests EMS crews should already have.66  
For this study, the Naval Postgraduate School Institutional Review Board (IRB) 
approved a three-part modified Delphi process employing an initial survey, a discussion-
based wargaming tabletop exercise (TTX), and a participant debrief to verify consensus. 
The approved IRB protocols for this study required the enforcement of several preventative 
measures to protect both the participants and the integrity of the research. Participant 
responses were anonymized throughout the study to protect their identity, and no 
personally identifiable information was collected. To safeguard against coercion or even 
the perception of coercion, all potential participants were informed that their participation 
was for research purposes and entirely voluntary; none of the participants had a supervisory 
relationship with either each other or the researcher. 
A panel of eight correctional experts, recruited from a diverse cross-section of 
CDCR correctional program areas relative to planning and response functions such as 
custody operations, medical, administration, and emergency management participated in 
the study. Additionally, also participating were two emergency planners from the state 
Office of Emergency Services with mutual aid and emergency response experience that 
involved the selected correctional facility. Participants each submitted a brief biographical 
sketch consisting of current job title, duty assignment, years of experience, positions 
worked, and other details necessary to establish credibility and expertise.  
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In the first Delphi iteration, panel members completed a brief survey (see Appendix 
A) that inquired about their perceptions of their organization’s preparedness and asked 
them to identify problems or difficulties they anticipated their facility would experience if 
an MCI event were to occur today. The survey began with a short description of that now 
infamous 2009 Southern California prison disturbance that escalated to an MCI as a way 
of providing the participants with context to frame the questions. With this historical 
incident as the background and context, participants were asked: 
• If your local institution were to experience a major, mass-casualty 
producing incident today, similar in size and scope to the 2009 incident, 
do you feel that your current plans and procedures have prepared your 
institution for such an event?  
• Please describe any joint planning activities you have participated in with 
local first responders, or any other emergency preparedness activities you 
have been a part of in the last 12 months. 
• If your local institution were to experience an event like the one described 
above, please briefly describe the areas or issues that in your opinion 
would go well. 
• Briefly describe the areas or issues that in your opinion would require 
substantial improvement, or points of failure. 
Participants completed the initial survey individually, at their respective places of 
work and without knowing the identities of the other participants, further safeguarding 
against participant-to-participant coercion. With the assurance of anonymity, they could 
answer freely without fear of reprisal for sharing an unpopular opinion or controversial 
topic. As an additional safeguard, they were asked to avoid sharing their surveys with 
coworkers or other participants, satisfying IRB protocols for preventing coercion and 
protecting research subjects.  
The second Delphi iteration presented participants with a case study involving 
interactive, fictional although credible, emergency response scenarios taking place at an 
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actual prison familiar to the panel. Participants faced operational problems, constraints, and 
likely planning gaps based on data collected from the gap analysis and survey, 
representative of the types of issues they would like encounter in a prison MCI. In response 
to the evolving disaster scenario, participants described in detail their current emergency 
plans and procedures as well as the communication systems and equipment likely 
employed. They recommended solutions in terms of policy or procedures and, if feasible, 
developed actual tactics in situations where plans and assumptions did not anticipate the 
real-world implications of an incident of this magnitude. Correctional staff perform their 
duties in a dangerous environment, increasing the likelihood of having experienced or 
witnessed a traumatic event on the job. As a precautionary elective measure, IRB protocols 
required notifying participants in advance of the potentially stressful nature of the scenario 
and its potential for triggering a reaction among those participants who may suffer from 
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Panel members were free to leave the room 
temporarily or discontinue participation if they experienced an emotional reaction. The 
outcomes and solutions of this exercise were then compared to the gap analysis, screened 
for doctrinal compliance, and used to make recommendations for a prison MCI planning 
framework.  
As the third Delphi iteration and to ensure consensus, the final set of 
recommendations was presented to the panel for comment and feedback prior to thesis 
submission. The CDCR may be unique in that it is one of the few state correctional agencies 
with a fully developed emergency management program that meets federal standards, 
bringing additional credibility to the final outcome of this thesis. 
Chapter II details the full scope of the prison MCI planning gap through a gap 
analysis comparing desired performance found in doctrine to outcomes from actual events, 
and then framing those issues in a correctional context. This review of the doctrine behind 
domestic mass-casualty planning and response provides a snapshot of the systems and 
methods available to emergency planners and first responders and serves as the foundation 
used to analyze the planning and response shortfalls identified in a series of MCIs. This 
chapter concludes with a discussion of these issues in the context of a correctional 
environment. Chapter III contains a validation of these potential prison mass-casualty–
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planning shortfalls. This chapter introduces the concept of wargaming to discover planning 
gaps and develop solutions, then employs this process with a panel of subject matter 
experts. Chapter IV provides this study’s conclusions and introduces a planning framework 
for prison MCIs.  
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II. CONDUCTING A GAP ANALYSIS 
This thesis asks the question, “How can a framework be developed that will 
improve prison mass-casualty planning and response?” The art and science behind 
predictive analysis suggest that extrapolating information from known data may provide 
indicators of future behavior; however, the corrections enterprise is generally lacking in 
prison-specific mass-casualty planning guidance, historical information, incident records, 
or other suitable performance data to serve as a logical starting point. Studying these types 
of incidents through direct observation is simply not possible, and accurate performance 
cannot be fully determined through full-scale exercises. In the absence of such data, a gap 
analysis comparing optimal performance or desired outcomes to the actual performance 
documented in MCI events forms the basis for a substitute dataset.  
This chapter details the process of conducting a gap analysis to identify potential 
planning and response issues and tactical considerations critical to developing a prison 
MCI planning framework. The desired outcomes extrapolated from federally prescribed 
methods and incident management models serves as the performance baseline in the gap 
analysis. A discussion of actual MCI incidents follows, highlighting responder shortfalls 
and key lessons learned from those events that are applicable to the problem space. Issues 
involving a secured facility are especially of interest because in many ways these types of 
incidents replicate the challenges correctional institutions may experience when attempting 
to operate jointly with first responders in an environment separated by both physical and 
operational security barriers. This chapter concludes with an analysis of the prison MCI 
planning gap, applying these issues to a specific correctional setting to validate the gaps in 
prison MCI planning. The task of establishing a performance baseline begins with the 
guiding documents that forms the doctrinal foundations of MCI planning and response. 
The sum of federal documents that comprises the overall doctrine is extensive and it would 
be impractical to review all of it in its entirety in order to demonstrate the full scope of 
desired performance. However, a brief discussion of the history, relationships, and content 
of these doctrinal materials, which includes federal guidance documents such as NIMS, is 
necessary to demonstrate how they form the basis for MCI planning and response doctrine 
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and to illustrate the strategic and organizational-level concepts that drives operational-level 
planning and tactical-level response. Professional journals, while not necessarily doctrinal, 
should not be ruled out as a source of baseline performance data as they are generally 
written for the profession, by the profession, and in many cases seek to clarify or enhance 
the materials supplied by official government sources. Where NIMS may sometimes 
express doctrinal guidance in broad terms, leaving it up to the individual jurisdictions and 
disciplines to interpret and adapt their planning and response processes, the tips and best 
practices supplied from these publications often provides a critical and timely perspective 
of tactical-level issues. 
A. DESIRED PERFORMANCE PRESCRIBED IN DOCTRINE  
In 2003, President George W. Bush issued Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive-5, ordering the establishment of a “single, comprehensive approach to domestic 
incident management.”67 Building on the lessons learned from the 9/11 attacks, the nation 
was in need of a formalized, unifying system that would provide continuity in planning and 
response across all levels of government. The NRF, originally released as the National 
Response Plan in 2004, became the strategic-level master document of our nation’s 
emergency management program. The NRF codifies a holistic, whole community approach 
to all aspects of the emergency management enterprise through key principles such as a 
tiered response model; engaged partnerships; unity of effort; and scalable, flexible, and 
adaptable operational capabilities. The improved system of doctrine sought to standardize 
emergency management, arming planners and responders with the doctrinal “concepts, 
principles, and terminology”; words and phrases often associated with a professional 
discipline, a culture, or even a belief system.68 Since promulgation, the NRF and its 
components have been adopted nationally by nearly every response agency. Today, 
members of the emergency management community subscribe to this shared vision, speak 
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a common language, use similar terms, and are united through this set of goals and 
standardized practices. FEMA’s 2018–2022 strategic plan even speaks of a building a 
“culture of preparedness,” implying an enterprise-wide community connected by 
doctrine.69 
This multi-echelon federal framework represented a radical departure from the 
previous “federal-centric” plans, recognizing that in most cases a catastrophic incident will 
begin and end at the local level, often bookending a robust state and federal response in-
between. Under the whole community concept, when one tier, such as a local government, 
is overwhelmed by an incident or lacks the capabilities to respond, it is the intent of the 
national framework to provide additional personnel and materials to augment those local 
efforts and scale up the response by activating county, state, and federal response agencies.  
Using a fictional county as an example, Laurel County represents a typical, rural 
county located in the heart of Anystate, USA. The Laurel County Sheriff’s Office 
administers public safety services to the smaller towns and unincorporated areas, while the 
cities of Johnstown and Columbia both operate their own police, fire, and EMS 
departments. The Laurel County Office of Emergency Management resides in the county 
sheriff’s office and serves as the county emergency management authority. A series of 
severe thunderstorms have swelled the local rivers and streams, threatening to flood both 
Johnstown and Columbia; several smaller towns that dot the county map have already 
experienced flooding. These local towns lack sufficient labor and supplies to respond to 
the emergency, prompting Laurel County to bring additional dump trucks, sandbags, and 
crews to mitigate the flood’s effects. After several more days of intense rain, the state’s 
governor mobilizes state swift-water rescue teams and the National Guard to rescue 
hundreds of Johnstown residents stranded on the rooftops of their homes. With thousands 
of residents displaced or living in shelters, FEMA arrives with truckloads of bottled water, 
delivers trailers for temporary shelters, and establishes a disaster recovery center. Under 
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the NRF’s vision, multiple disciplines from all levels of government come together to 
support local response efforts.  
While it was always incumbent upon local responders to be first in, it was now 
explicitly clear in federal doctrine that (for most incident types) local communities such as 
those in Laurel County truly have the lead role, supported by state and federal response 
agencies. This scenario is an extremely simplified representation of the tiered response 
model; coordinating the actions of multiple fire, law enforcement, public works, federal 
responders, and even military resources converging on a local jurisdiction and responding 
together harmoniously was previously fraught with operational and jurisdictional peril. The 
NRF provides further guidance for unifying these disparate disciplines and jurisdictions 
via NIMS.70 NIMS is billed as an all-hazards approach to emergency management and 
explicates the methods for accomplishing the NRF by providing emergency response 
agencies at the federal, state, and local levels with organizational-level planning and 
response guidance as well as a management framework applicable to both the 
organizational and tactical levels.71 Where the NRF is essentially the vision or blueprint, 
NIMS is the system for achieving it; the guiding principles of flexibility, standardization, 
and unity of effort serve as the theoretical backbone of NIMS and supports the NRF’s 
whole community approach, framing the operational concepts of resource management, 
command and coordination, and communications and information management.72 These 
principles and concepts infer several key performance outcomes with regard to planning 
for and responding to multi-agency, multi-jurisdictional events such as an MCI.  
First, response agencies are encouraged to share risk and pool resources with 
neighboring jurisdictions in order to develop mutually supporting capabilities. A small 
town with a single ambulance may find itself suddenly resource constrained and limited in 
its ability to deliver emergency care when facing a multi-car collision with several seriously 
injured patients. However, several neighboring towns can potentially augment their EMS 
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resources by establishing a formal agreement for mutual aid, thereby agreeing to support 
each other when needed. This acts as a force multiplier for each participating jurisdiction, 
allowing each of them to temporarily gain additional response capability without investing 
in additional ambulances or personnel. On a larger scale, agreements such as this may be 
formed regionally or even developed as a statewide capability, furthering the whole 
community approach. Similarly, these agreements may involve the deployment of mixed-
resource types to form a joint response capability, such as multiple jurisdictions providing 
a helicopter and off-road vehicles to form a search and rescue team to locate hikers lost in 
the wilderness. Although formalized agreements are beneficial, they are not necessarily 
required. Mutual aid is the simple act of neighbors helping neighbors, or more specifically, 
neighboring jurisdictions helping each other. A jurisdiction in need can also ask for 
assistance directly or through their respective mutual aid system, as NIMS doctrine 
provides an integrated method for counties, regions, or states to manage and facilitate 
mutual aid requests.  
The complementary NIMS principles of flexibility and standardization further 
unifies these response organizations and helps them to overcome operational challenges. 
While some would argue that standardization equates to rigidity and may be the polar 
opposite of flexibility, standardized terminology, communications, equipment, and tactics 
actually enhances response capability. Standardized emergency response resources are 
deployable across the nation, adding flexibility; similar to how military units are 
standardized and interchangeable. NIMS provides universal standards for certain 
equipment types such as fire engines, ensuring that the appropriate resource will meet the 
needs of the incident, regardless of from which fire agency it was ordered.  
While some might consider resources to describe only materials and equipment, the 
doctrine defines resources to also include personnel.73 One of the exceptional outcomes of 
NIMS and the standardization that it brought to the enterprise is the concept of 
credentialing and qualifying response personnel, ensuring responders providing mutual aid 
support from another jurisdiction have the “knowledge, experience, training, and 
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capability” to perform their assigned role as well as support the jurisdictions in need.74 To 
achieve these credentials, FEMA provides an extensive NIMS training program comprised 
of both distance learning courses as well as traditional classroom and hands-on training.75 
Therefore, it can be presumed that an incident commander and other responders will have 
sufficient experience and training when assuming command or other leadership roles and 
be fully able to execute the required duties of those positions.  
In order to operate together efficiently and safely, responders in these jurisdictions 
must also be able to communicate with each other, share information, and maintain 
situational awareness. NIMS’s communications and information management principles 
describes data, voice, and digital communications technology; information sharing and 
common operating procedures; and addresses issues such as radio frequency management 
and training. It is similar to mutual aid planning in that NIMS recommends that neighboring 
jurisdictions or regional response partners engage in planning discussions and training 
activities to ensure their communications platforms are interoperable across agencies and 
jurisdictions.76  
The command and coordination component of NIMS represents perhaps the largest 
portion of the doctrine, detailing “the systems, principles, and structures that provide a 
standard, national framework for incident management.”77 ICS, a tactical-level component 
of NIMS, provides frameworks for organizational management, information flow, and 
even incident action planning models.78 Incident commanders arrive on-scene armed with 
the organizational structure, rules for managing and growing the organization, as well as 
the roles and responsibilities for various incident management positions.79 Under the ICS 
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management structure, a single responding agency, or multiple agencies, may form a 
temporary organization and respond jointly, scaling the size of the organization to meet the 
needs of any type of event, regardless of the size of the incident. As is critical with larger 
events, multiple jurisdictions and disciplines quickly integrate together and operate in the 
same space without competing for resources or yielding their statutory authority.80 These 
larger, more complex incidents, such as an MCI, will typically involve multiple 
jurisdictions sharing the same operational space. The unified command concept within 
NIMS and ICS prescribes the methods for multiple agencies to jointly determine priorities 
and incident objectives and leads the incident response together as a management team 
without being subordinate to other response agencies.81 Using Laurel County again as an 
example: a prison transport bus overturns on a highway, resulting in numerous injuries. 
While the state police may have primary jurisdiction over highway accidents, local fire and 
EMS are also dispatched from Columbia and Johnstown due to the number of injured 
passengers who require medical attention. As the bus passengers are inmates, state prison 
has jurisdiction over their custody and care. All of the agencies in this example have a legal 
and statutory authority to respond, however none of them have primary authority or all the 
resources necessary to handle the entire incident.  
In addition to the whole community emergency management model and the 
doctrinal, all-hazards management frameworks, FEMA also provides some general pre-
incident planning companion documents worthy of note in the development of a prison 
MCI framework. The Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA) and 
Stakeholder Preparedness Review (SPR) Guide provides guidance for identifying potential 
threats or facilities at risk, further complementing the previously discussed NIMS 
elements.82 Assuming a jurisdiction adopts NIMS and plans for large-scale medical 
emergencies, these sources recommend pre-incident resource-planning considerations such 
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as stockpiling the types and quantities of medical and other supplies needed for an MCI in 
addition to the logistics requirements necessary for a jurisdiction’s day-to-day, routine 
emergencies.83 The Journal of Emergency Medical Services further recommends mass-
gathering venues such as schools, stadiums, and even prisons develop and store their own 
medical caches to include a supply of backboards, as these are frequently in short supply.84 
Commercial MCI kits containing standardized supplies such as colored tarps and 
identification tags for patient sorting and triage are readily available; however, 
recommendations for these kits typically come from within the discipline or depend upon 
a jurisdiction’s formal adoption of this particular method.85  
In response to various shortcomings in mass-casualty planning and response, 
FEMA released Operational Templates and Guidance for EMS Mass Incident Deployment 
in 2012; Fire/Emergency Medical Services Department Operational Considerations and 
Guide for Active Shooter and Mass Casualty Incidents soon followed in 2013. As 
discipline-specific doctrinal guides, they recommend following the established doctrine 
and principles of NIMS, building upon and reinforcing ICS as the universally adopted 
command structure. These guides offer basic MCI pre-planning considerations for mass-
gathering venues and recommend the establishment of ICS medical management positions 
such as the medical branch director and triage group supervisor to lead, direct, and task 
organize triage and treatment.86 Operational Considerations further refines these issues 
by extracting a list of critical actions from NIMS and ICS into a single-page guide for the 
incident commander.87 These guides reflect several critical MCI elements learned from 
                                                 
83 Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Incident Management System, 6. 
84 Heightman, “10 Tips to Help Gear Up for MCIs,” 4. 
85 Heightman, 3. 
86 U.S. Fire Administration, Operational Considerations; U.S. Fire Administration, Federal 
Emergency Management Agency, and U.S. Fire Administration, Operational Templates. 
87 U.S. Fire Administration, Operational Considerations, 5. 
 
31 
active shooter incidents, such as establishing casualty collection points and evacuation 
routes, and introduces the Hartford Consensus THREAT model.88  
In an effort to “create a protocol for national policy to enhance survivability from 
active shooter and intentional mass casualty events,” a consortium of surgeons, 
government, military, and law enforcement leaders formed the Joint Committee to Create 
a National Policy to Enhance Survivability from Intentional Mass-casualty and Active 
Shooter Events.89 Published as The Hartford Consensus and promulgated by FEMA, these 
tactical recommendations for MCI responders prioritize steps for reducing mortality due to 
the profuse bleeding common to active shooter incidents.90 Hartford developed the 
mnemonic THREAT to summarize their recommended critical response elements:  
T—Threat suppression 
H—Hemorrhage control 
RE—Rapid Extrication to safety 
A—Assessment by medical providers 
T—Transport to definitive care91 
While responder safety is an overriding concern in any incident, hemorrhage 
control and transportation to medical care are the top recommendations provided by the 
Hartford THREAT response model. Patient movement is prioritized through triage, and a 
well-managed incident site facilitates expedited transportation to medical care, thereby 
improving overall chances of survival. It can be argued that all other elements of MCI 
planning and response stem from or support hemorrhage control and transport to care.  
In summary, the doctrine is a strategic-level guide; however, as source documents 
for prison mass-casualty planning, it is a starting point but certainly not the answer. The 
official doctrine codifies the national vision for a unified, whole community approach to 
emergency planning and response. Under this whole community concept, all response 
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agencies work together to jointly plan, build response capabilities, and mutually support 
disaster response. The NRF and its supporting documents describe general planning 
outcomes and provide a management structure for incident response, allowing multiple 
agencies and disciplines to come together and execute a unified response. Although the 
doctrine takes an all-hazards approach, several desired performance outcomes described in 
these planning documents point toward general planning considerations worth further 
exploration and refinement.  
First, MCIs are likely to be multiagency events, making the whole community 
concept even more relevant to prison mass-casualty planning. Simply engaging local and 
state planning partners in discussions about community emergency planning, available 
resources, and response capabilities as envisioned by the NRF starts the process of prisons 
joining the whole community described in doctrine. Addressing doctrinal issues such as 
threat assessments, interoperable communication systems, and medical supply caches 
works toward building local capabilities that support prison mass-casualty response. 
However, these are strategic planning concepts, not the organizational and tactical 
guidance necessary to developing a prison framework.  
At the tactical level, the doctrine highlights management of the incident site through 
the employment of ICS, the doctrinal management model, as a critical response component. 
Adoption of NIMS and ICS serves as the point of entry for joining the emergency 
management community and provides the very basic knowledge, skills, and abilities 
necessary to apply these MCI specific guides. Authors such as Savilonis and others have 
documented the failure of the corrections enterprise to plan for emergencies, which in and 
of itself represents a major performance gap. Adopting the doctrine and applying the 
systems and management models that comes with it is perhaps one of the most significant 
desired performance outcomes due to the interdependencies with other desired outcomes. 
B. ACTUAL PERFORMANCE IN MCI EVENTS 
This section examines the performance and lessons learned from actual events and 
correlates them to specific doctrinal issues or identifies them as tactics or procedures that 
support doctrine. The national adoption of NIMS and ICS as doctrine and the resulting 
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standardization across the enterprise lends great credibility to post-incident analysis 
documents such as incident after action reports or formalized lessons-learned white papers; 
the issues these documents discuss are typically doctrinal as opposed to focusing on local 
policies and therefore have applicability regardless of jurisdiction. Additionally, FEMA, 
as the national authority on NIMS, publishes lessons learned documents that can be 
assumed to indicate nationwide performance trends that should be analyzed along with 
after action reports. Where the doctrine is typically broad and strategic in nature, the 
information extracted from these incidents and reports produces an organizational and 
tactical level of detail. 
These incidents represent a cross-section of disasters and communities. Many other 
incidents were also studied in addition to these events; however, these specific events were 
well-documented and provided critical details necessary to illustrate deficiencies in 
sufficient detail to be useful in the development of a framework. These incidents include:  
1. 1999 Columbine High School massacre, Littleton, Colorado. Two 
students used firearms and homemade explosive devices resulting in 13 
deaths and 160 injured.92 Multiple buildings and ingress routes presented 
a challenging space for responders. The combination of fires and injuries 
from both the explosions and bullets required a tactical response, a bomb 
squad, fire, and medical. This incident has long become synonymous with 
active shooter incidents. 
2. 2003 Station nightclub fire, West Warwick, Rhode Island. Stage 
pyrotechnics ignited a fire in a crowded club causing 100 deaths and over 
200 injuries; multiple EMS agencies deployed an estimated 60 medical 
units.93 This incident has been the subject of several FEMA lessons 
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learned white papers highlighting both doctrinal successes as well as first 
responder deficiencies in managing the scene of a major incident.  
3. 2008 Imperial Sugar Dixie Crystal Plant fire, Port Wentworth, 
Georgia. An explosion and fire resulted in the deaths of eight employees 
and injured 36 others who required emergency transport by both 
ambulance and helicopter to surrounding hospitals.94  
4. 2009 California Institution for Men (CIM) riot, Chino, California. The 
Chino prison riot is by far one of California’s worst prison incidents since 
a 1927 prison riot that resulted in the mobilization of California National 
Guard units.95 In 2009, an inmate fight quickly turned into a full-scale riot 
after weeks of escalating tensions between inmate racial groups. Buildings 
burned and inmates fought with homemade weapons for several hours 
until prison staff regained control. Local and surrounding police and 
sheriff’s departments responded to provide additional outside security 
while multiple fire and EMS agencies triaged 250 inmates. They treated 
195 injured inmates on-site and transported another 55 inmates to local 
hospitals.96  
5. 2012 Aurora Movie Theater shooting, Aurora, Colorado. A single 
shooter assaulted moviegoers attending a midnight premiere, killing 12 
and wounding 58, and 12 additional people suffered serious injuries while 
escaping.97 While the overall response was successful, the massive influx 
of responder vehicles blocked traffic routes and prevented ambulances 
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from accessing the incident site; some victims had to be transported by 
police car to awaiting ambulances.98  
6. 2013 Washington Navy Yard active shooter incident, Washington, 
DC. A contract employee of the military facility killed 12 people and 
injured three others.99 Outside law enforcement initially experienced 
difficulties gaining access to the military base, followed by challenges in 
identifying the actual building where the shooter was located.100 The 
responders who navigated through the main site of the incident reported 
that they were unfamiliar with the facility and the structure was complex 
and confusing.101  
7. 2013 Boston Marathon bombing, Boston, Massachusetts. Two brothers 
placed explosive devices near the end of the marathon route, killing three 
spectators and injuring 264.102 Although the injuries of some victims were 
so severe that they required limb amputations, none of the casualties 
transported lost their lives.103 The Boston emergency management 
community conducted extensive planning in preparation for this event and 
is credited with this successful outcome.104 
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Somewhat common to all incidents is the order in which response actions occur. 
As a method of highlighting potential gaps relevant to prison MCI planning and response, 
these events are presented in the context of alert and notification, the initial response 
actions and establishing incident command, extraction, triage, treatment and evacuation, 
and issues related to post-incident medical surge.  
1. Alert and Notification 
Like most emergencies, the initial notification that alerts responders typically 
occurs through the local 911 system via a phone call from a witness or non-responder, 
followed by emergency dispatchers activating an initial wave of first responders. The 
closest available resources arrive first, followed by additional resources as needed. For 
example, in the 1999 Columbine High School shooting, two nearby ambulances were 
dispatched from the initial 911 call, quickly followed by two additional EMS resources and 
a medical helicopter that was placed on alert.105  
This process accelerates dramatically with the formal notification or declaration of 
an MCI, in many cases automatically triggering the deployment of a pre-determined set of 
resources or mutual aid from adjoining jurisdictions. Like the spreading ripples in a pond, 
EMS and other emergency resources farther and farther away from the incident are 
activated and either deployed to the incident site or placed on standby to ensure that 
neighboring regions recently depleted of EMS resources have sufficient coverage.106 
Among the first actions initiated by the incident commander or medical response 
supervisor is sizing up the incident to assess if the EMS resources currently on scene or en 
route are sufficient for the size and scope of the disaster. As dispatchers receive the 
subsequent 911 calls and aggregate additional details about the incident, or the responders 
on scene determine that the quantities and types of injuries exceed that pre-determined 
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threshold, the formal declaration of an MCI signals the activation of the regional MCI or 
disaster medical mutual aid plan.107 The process may vary by state or region; in states such 
as California, designated regional disaster medical coordinators may contact adjoining 
medical response regions and coordinate additional medical resources to augment those 
available in the affected region.108 While the specific trigger that launches these additional 
EMS resources varies by city, county, or region, generally this threshold is based on the 
capacity of the original EMS system. FEMA reports that gaps in recognizing that an MCI 
incident is actually occurring is a systemic problem among medical responders and 
dispatchers; they may be confusing an MCI with a surge in emergency calls or simply 
addressing the MCI as multiple individual calls without truly assessing the magnitude of 
the event.109 Time is of the essence during a medical emergency; with these additional 
MCI resources, potentially deploying from outside of their usual response area, it is 
especially critical to initiate this successive chain of events as soon as possible.110  
Of the MCI events surveyed, incidents on military bases and colleges that used an 
internal emergency phone number rather than the standard 911 noted delays in 
communicating the severity and scale of their MCI events to the outside 911-dispatch 
system. Following the 2009 Ft. Hood shooting, military officials changed or added internal 
emergency call handling with the intent of improving the response time of installation law 
enforcement to internal calls.111 Military installations such as the Washington Navy Yard 
promoted the use of an internal 4-digit emergency number that alerted base security forces, 
however 911 calls were routed outside to the District of Columbia’s emergency call 
center.112 The Washington Naval Yard incident noted an eight-minute gap in incoming 
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calls between internal and external call centers during the early moments of its active 
shooter incident.113 Similarly, at the University of Texas at Austin, the campus emergency 
dispatch answered 911 calls placed from a campus phone, while the nearby Austin Police 
Department received 911 calls placed from cellular phones; the Austin Police Department 
would then in turn contact campus police.114 At the time of its active shooter incident, the 
university’s call system could only accommodate three lines and was quickly overloaded; 
it also lacked the capability to transfer additional call traffic to the outside 911 system.115 
While these internal calling procedures may have improved local response times for routine 
and small-scale emergencies, they likely delayed the response and coordination of outside 
law enforcement and hindered the transition from routine emergency to full-scale MCI 
response. As the incident develops, these communications problems lead to lapses in the 
common operating picture so relied upon by the incident commander and responding 
agencies.  
2. Initial Response and Establishing Incident Command 
As first responders arrive on scene, the incident commander assumes command, 
establishes the incident command post, and appoints responding personnel to fill critical 
positions under the ICS.116 If multiple agencies are involved, doctrine specifies they may 
manage jointly following the unified command concept; this method allows them to 
maintain jurisdictional authority while still providing for a functional lead agency based on 
the type incident, which may change as the incident progresses.117 For example, an active 
shooter incident may initially require a law enforcement lead to secure the incident site, 
and then transition to an EMS lead to manage the medical response as law enforcement 
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shifts to support role.118 Fire and law enforcement traditionally take lead roles in these 
emergencies; however, the most recent doctrinal guidance encourages EMS agencies to 
improve their integration into joint operations.119  
MCI events bring responders and potentially mobile command vehicles from any 
number of fire, EMS, and law enforcement agencies. Contrary to reportedly popular 
practices, simply parking the command vehicles from multiple agencies side-by-side is not 
a unified command.120 As active shooter incidents became more prominent, updated 
guidelines on joint operations under a unified command often reiterate the need for a single 
command post.121 Doctrine further suggests the command post should be large enough to 
accommodate the unified command staff and be located where it is accessible to all of the 
agencies involved. The city of Austin deployed their mobile command vehicle to the 
University of Texas at Austin in support of the 2010 active shooter response, and although 
the unified command was successful, the command post could not accommodate all the 
decision-makers who needed to operate in the command vehicle.122  
Incident commanders may struggle to establish a unified command when the 
location of the incident, especially in secured facilities, potentially delays responders and 
separates the command elements, thereby preventing a joint response. The 2009 CIM riot 
in Chino, California, brought multiple responding agencies, many with their own mobile 
command posts.123 The warden’s conference room, located within the secure confines of 
the prison, often serves as the command post during routine prison emergencies; however, 
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previous emergencies rarely required coordination with outside agencies.124 As such, 
existing emergency plans lacked direction on how to utilize the responding outside law 
enforcement or EMS providers who were now operating out of their own command posts 
in the prison parking lot.125 The prison was fully engaged in disturbance control measures 
for several hours, clearing housing units, and attempting to regain control of the chaos 
occurring inside their secure perimeter while many available outside responders awaited 
further direction.126 Prison planners clearly never anticipated an event of this magnitude 
or the need to integrate with outside agencies.  
The challenge of conducting emergency response in restrictive or secured 
environments is not unique to prisons. The Washington Navy Yard is a gated military 
facility; its security protocols called for locking down the gates during security 
incidents.127 During the 2013 active shooter incident, responding outside law enforcement 
from several agencies arrived at the military base only to find the gates locked and 
unstaffed; the assigned security personnel were all inside the base, responding the 
shooter.128 Similar the CIM prison riot, the base command post secured inside the facility, 
completely isolated from the command posts established by the responding agencies 
outside of the facility.129 Once these responders gained access to the base, they were 
further delayed by the unfamiliar layout and unclear building markings. Like most military 
facilities, building addresses consist solely of a three or four digit number that does not 
include a corresponding street name.130 While attempting to respond, police encountered 
several civilians and asked them for directions, but despite working at the Navy Yard they 
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could not immediately recall the location of “Building 197”; police eventually located the 
correct building having observed people running away from it.131 Communication issues 
can further exacerbate challenges of operating in a restrictive environment.  
Interoperable communications has long been a basic tenet of ICS and functional 
communications in general are a requirement for first responders to operate safely and 
efficiently.132 The Columbine incident documented multiple communications challenges; 
fire service could not communicate directly with law enforcement and the triage area turned 
out to be a radio “dead zone,” blocking out most radio transmissions.133 EMS responders 
from multiple jurisdiction arrived on scene unable to communicate on a common 
frequency; desperate to bridge the communications gap, many resorted to using cell 
phones.134 Over a decade later, the report on CIM riot would report similar circumstance. 
Prison telephones were unaffected by the fires; however, the minimal number of phone 
lines in the command post could not keep up with the high volume of calls.135 Staff also 
reported communications dead zones in several hard structures and were forced to exit 
those buildings to improve radio reception.136 Additionally, CIM’s radios were 
incompatible with those used by outside law enforcement and fire agencies, and the prison 
itself lacked sufficient quantities of radios to equip its own staff.137 With no other option, 
it was necessary to employ runners to hand-deliver messages to the responders in the 
parking lot.138  
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Another critical element of this phase is appointing response personnel to perform 
critical site management tasks and logistics functions.139 Numerous incident after action 
reports and professional journals continually emphasize the critical importance of 
appointing a staging area manager when planning for or responding to an MCI. The Journal 
of Emergency Services cites issues that hinder ingress, egress, and vehicle movements 
among the top concerns in MCI site management.140 The ability of EMS providers to 
quickly access the site, receive patients, and evacuate them to a hospital for advanced care 
further echoes the concepts behind the Hartford THREAT model and relies on unimpeded 
patient access and movement. The 2003 Station nightclub fire resulted in over 200 fire and 
related injuries and 100 deaths; an estimated 60 ambulances deployed on-scene in addition 
to the many first responder vehicles, fire apparatuses, and news vans.141 Like most MCI 
events, this incident lacked a large parking area immediately adjacent to the fire. The initial 
wave of response vehicles quickly began blocking access to the site, hindering vehicle 
movement and preventing ambulances and other emergency vehicles from leaving.142 The 
incident commander, a fire chief, did not establish an EMS branch command or the staging 
area manager needed to manage the scene as doctrine suggests; however, several 
experienced EMS personnel took it upon themselves to assume these positions early on 
and are credited with preventing a bad incident from unraveling into further chaos.143 An 
EMS supervisor assumed the role of staging area manager and begin routing non-essential 
vehicles and those not currently assigned a response task off the incident site, organizing 
vehicles in the nearest available spaces, and directing each ambulance to enter the incident 
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site only when specifically called forward for patient transport.144 By managing resource 
staging and movement, and maintaining open ingress and egress routes, emergency 
vehicles were are able to enter quickly, load patients, and exit the site immediately and 
without any further unnecessary delay. As the Station club fire demonstrates, in the early 
chaotic moments of responding to the incident these duties are easily overlooked, 
particularly when multiple disciplines are executing a joint response. These tasks are 
outlined in ICS position training, which also recommends the person performing this 
function wear a high-visibility clothing item like a safety vest so that arriving personnel 
can quickly identify them.145  
In addition to staging responder resources, a separate staging area for media and a 
designated location to brief the press is both doctrinal as well as a recognized best 
practice.146 Active shooter incidents are especially attractive to the media, but any MCI 
event is likely to draw media attention. During the University of Texas at Austin event, the 
media reportedly arrived at the same time as first responders.147 Similarly, the lessons-
learned white paper on the Station club fire noted the high quantity of media vehicles.148 
Placing them away from the incident is a recommended planning consideration for both 
safety and security, and further contributes to keeping ingresses and egresses clear.  
3. Extraction, Triage, and Treatment 
Removing the injured from danger, stabilizing the patient or mitigating further 
injury, and transporting them to medical care represent the priorities of effort in an MCI 
event. A casualty collection point provides a central location, removed from immediate 
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danger, for medical responders to triage patients and prioritize them for transport to local 
hospitals. These actions may be occurring concurrent to events or are dependent on incident 
stabilization if an active threat endangers responder safety, further delaying first responders 
from reaching the casualties until the threat is sufficiently mitigated. With the patients 
assembling at a central location, first responders can then prioritize treatment and 
transportation to hospitals. While the use of casualty collection points was endorsed as 
early as the 1999 Columbine incident, more recent discussions about active shooter tactics, 
such as the Hartford THREAT model, appear to have revived and placed new emphasis on 
this tactic.149 Sometimes just getting the wounded to medical aid is a challenge. 
The Aurora movie theater shooting illustrates the challenges of patient extraction 
during both an active shooter incident and a poorly managed incident site. Responding 
police officers arrived to an already crowded parking lot, leaving their cars unattended 
without regard to the medical response that would soon follow.150 Haphazard responder 
parking restricted additional emergency vehicles such as ambulances from positioning 
close enough to the incident site to load patients, so the decision was made to load patients 
into police cars and civilian vehicles.151 Of the 60 patients transported to local hospitals, 
only 20 were transported by ambulance.152 Vehicle staging and incident site management 
clearly had a trickle-down effect, interfering with patient extraction and transport.  
Prison incidents bring their own set of unique triage challenges. During the 2009 
CIM riot, prison medical staff found themselves in a dilemma never before experienced by 
a California prison. The prison’s medical clinic typically handles the relatively small 
numbers of injuries that result from the frequent inmate melees and yard disturbances; 
however, 250 injuries, with 55 requiring hospitalization, far exceeds the prison clinic’s 
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capabilities and staffing.153 During the event, the prison clinic quickly filled to capacity; 
with an out-of-control riot in progress and several buildings engulfed in flames, the prison 
yard was unsuitable for triaging patients.154 The overwhelmed medical staff needed help 
keeping up with the volume of serious injuries but outside EMS personnel could not (and 
likely would not) enter an active threat environment.155 Life safety took precedent over 
security as a casualty collection point was established in the main parking lot beyond the 
secure perimeter, allowing first responders to access and triage the inmate-patients while 
local police and sheriff’s deputies augmented prison staff with armed security.156 Although 
this was a prison incident, responding fire and EMS agencies performed triage jointly with 
prison medical staff, led by one local responder assuming the role of EMS supervisor and 
directing patient movement.157 
Establishing a triage area in the prison parking lot was an ad-hoc decision, hastily 
made to overcome operational challenges and employ all available resources. Similarly, in 
the 2003 Station club incident, medical responders from multiple agencies converged upon 
the incident and rapidly provided triage and treatment for nearly 200 casualties.158 In a 
2014 white paper, FEMA credits the success of the Station club response with the adoption 
of a standardized triage process and encourages other agencies to make this a part of their 
plan.159 These scenarios reiterate how doctrinal concepts such as joint planning and the 
adoption of standardized processes improves response and likely saves lives.  
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Depending on the types and severity of the injuries, these incidents can be resource-
intensive and quickly deplete medical supplies, which are critical for treatment and 
illustrate the need to prepare logistically as described in doctrine.160 The California prison 
that found itself deeply embroiled in an extended riot and MCI event was also without the 
triage tags and colored tarps that had long become the standard equipment stored for just 
such an event, and had to rely on the local fire department to provide them.161 Additionally, 
the prison ran out of other critical medical supplies and had to resort to using field-
expedient methods such as crafting splints out of cardboard and tape.162 In addition to 
stocking the tarps and triage tags, the report on CIM also suggested increasing the inventory 
of backboards, cervical collars, and stand-by operational supplies such as flashlights, as 
this event occurred just before midnight and required the establishment of a triage and 
treatment area in the prison parking lot.163 Similar recommendations were expressed after 
Columbine, suggesting that the community invest in pre-positioned medical caches 
sufficient to support an active shooter MCI.164 Heightman, too, asserts the need for a pre-
positioned cache of MCI supplies.165  
4. Medical Surge 
According to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) 
government website, medical surge “describes the ability to provide adequate medical 
evaluation and care during events that exceed the limits of the normal medical 
infrastructure of an affected community.”166 A majority of the incident reports analyzed 
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for this thesis focused almost entirely on the emergency management aspects and do not 
explicitly identify medical surge concerns; however, numerous reports have been 
published on MCI medical response that specifically highlight medical surge planning 
issues. While NIMS does not expressly discuss or reference medical surge capacity, the 
HHS does: as part of their mission “to enhance and protect the health and well-being of all 
Americans,” HHS provides detailed guidance to the hospital sector for medical surge 
preparedness.167 
While the most severe injuries will likely arrive by ambulance, studies of past 
incidents have shown that following an MCI, many with non-life threatening or less-severe 
injuries are likely to self-evacuate from the incident site; they will either initiate self-care 
or seek out transportation and medical care on their own.168 Resources such as medical 
staffing and treatment space quickly reach their limits, as the hospital must triage the 
walking wounded and the worried well in addition to the waves of the patients arriving by 
ambulance. Depending on the size and duration of the incident, injuries to responders may 
further extend the patient surge or create a second wave.169 Whether the crisis involves an 
infectious outbreak or an MCI, HHS advises hospitals to plan and prepare for this sudden 
spike and develop staffing and logistics plans to sustain this elevated operational pace for 
up to 72 hours.170  
Surge capacity is not only a critical disaster planning consideration for the medical 
community at large but it also presents a very real issue for prisons as well. Over 1,100 
inmates participated in the 2009 CIM riot, resulting in 250 195 inmate-patients requiring 
varying degrees of medical attention, including 55 requiring hospitalization; however, 
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those were only the injuries treated during the event itself.171 Not reported in the incident 
after action report, however, is the likely hundreds of injuries requiring medical attention 
after the major crisis subsided. After the outside first responders have departed the scene, 
prison medical staff must continue the exhaustive task of providing on-site care to this 
surge of inmate patients with varying degrees of riot-related injuries in addition to attending 
to the medical needs of patients now occupying clinic beds. All of this is in addition to the 
follow-up care required for days after the incident.  
In summary, after action reports and studies of actual incidents demonstrate 
doctrinal concepts and further define optimal performance. Where the doctrine discussed 
in the previous sections provides very broad guidance for general, all-hazards planning and 
response, the details mined from after action reports yields concrete and detailed examples 
of MCI planning and response considerations that merit further investigation into their 
applicability to prison MCI planning. Incidents that occurred in highly restrictive 
environments are especially valuable, indicating numerous similarities to difficulties that 
responders may experience in a prison environment.  
C. THE PRISON MCI PLANNING GAP 
While MCIs present response challenges in any environment, they are especially 
difficult in a prison. The health, safety, and legal risks associated with prison disasters and 
the systemic failure of the corrections enterprise to plan for them is well documented; while 
the doctrine itself takes an all-hazards approach, supplying the basic systems, frameworks, 
and methods, it is incumbent upon each jurisdiction or discipline to interpret the doctrine 
and develop local tactics and procedures. This creates a paradox of sorts; the proverbial 
Catch-22 of emergency planning. While there is an expectation of preparedness across the 
corrections enterprise, very little exists to describe the threats for which prisons should 
prepare. Developing a prison MCI plan in the absence of threat-specific or prison-specific 
planning guidance is a high-risk proposition when the operational environment or problem 
space is not fully understood.  
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This section completes the gap analysis by presenting a revised description of the 
problem space. The desired performance outcomes described in the doctrine and the actual 
performance outcomes identified from both prison and non-prison MCI events generates 
an entirely new perspective when viewed as a whole and framed in the context of an actual 
prison. This redefined problem space and its new vantage point yields a proposed prison 
mass-casualty–planning framework.  
The physical plant layout of these enormous, secured facilities is central to this 
discussion (see Figure 1). California operates some of the largest prisons in the United 
States, each one employing hundreds of staff and housing thousands of inmates. Salinas 
Valley State Prison (SVSP) in Soledad, California, is similar in size to other California 
prisons.172 Comprised of administrative offices, medical clinics, kitchens, warehouses, and 
industrial-sized shipping and receiving docks necessary to support multiple inmate housing 
units, prisons may occupy spaces even larger than SVSPs approximately .5-mile wide by 
.75-mile long footprint.173 A single road leads up to the facility’s main parking lot before 
branching off and circling the outer perimeter of the prison, which is wrapped in a lethal 
electrified fence and dotted with guard towers. Just inside, another road hugs the inner 
perimeter. The secured perimeter has limited vehicle access points leading to interior roads 
that allow slow-moving patrols or maintenance vehicles. Clusters of housing units form 
facilities, with access and movement between them severely restricted. Rapid traffic flow 
and interior vehicle access was not part of these facilities’ design.  
As a fixed location that routinely responds to small-scale medical emergencies, it 
can be assumed that prisons have plans and procedures in place to provide emergency first 
aid, while the more serious injuries merit a 911 call for emergency transportation to an 
outside hospital. These emergency calls may range from typical health issues and accidents 
to injuries stemming from acts of inmate-on-inmate violence. In the opening moments of 
an MCI event, it is essential that someone within the response organization recognize an 
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MCI is occurring and communicates that information to the emergency medical response 
community.174 This information has typically come from either the initial medical 
responders on scene who recognize the magnitude of the event and declares an MCI, or the 
911 dispatcher who observes a sudden increase in calls. FEMA and others have noted 
delays and even hesitation to declare an MCI out in public, thereby slowing down the 
activation and deployment of critical response resources. When a prison is ground zero for 
an MCI, the prison staff placing those 911 calls have first-hand knowledge of the size and 
scope of the incident; they have an opportunity to communicate that information and trigger 
the automatic deployment of outside EMS resources, rather than wait for the EMS system 
to trigger this response on its own. Procedures for providing 911 dispatchers with the 
appropriate information, warning hospitals to prepare for the surge in inmate patients, and 
activating medical mutual aid resources are the types of issues resolved through the joint 
planning and whole community model prescribed in NIMS.  
Once these resources arrive, they instantly create a site management problem. Many 
of the same conditions that lead to site management problems are visibly apparent when 
viewed in the context of a prison emergency. Depending on the physical layout of the 
prison and its particular procedures, a single ambulance or fire apparatus called to respond 
to routine emergencies will likely arrive at a specific entry point such as the facility’s front 
entrance or an administrative building. Prison staff may guide that single ambulance or fire 
apparatus through a secured, double-gate to prison clinic medical, or perhaps staff may 
deliver a patient on a gurney to an awaiting ambulance outside the gates. As actual prison 
incidents have shown, there exists the very real threat of a major incident occurring at any 
time that may bloom into an MCI. Prisons are designed with security in mind; 
unfortunately, the same physical features necessary to prevent, restrict, or channel 
movement are contrary to the types of movement and responder access necessary during 
MCI response. The CIM incident brought an estimated 33 ambulances, an EMS truck, four 
medical engines, and police vehicles sufficient to transport nearly 100 law enforcement 
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personnel.175 It is a reasonable assumption that a similar flood of vehicles swarming to this 
prison could quickly turn an already congested employee parking lot into an immovable 
traffic jam. Without a local plan to receive, stage, and direct these resources, the prison is 
relying on outside responders to accomplish tasks such as establishing emergency vehicle 
ingress and egress, maintaining traffic routes, and managing staging areas. Responders 
arriving for the first time at large facilities such as this will likely be looking for a visible 
address or building numbers to guide them; however, this massive complex has a single 
street address assigned to the primary administrative building situated in front, while the 
rest of the buildings have few if any discernable markings. With little or no direction, 
incidents have shown that responders will instinctively park closest to the incident with 
little regard to traffic flow, often with detrimental results. Such delays threaten both life 
and safety.  
Further adding to this confusion is the sheer volume of resources likely to converge 
on the facility during an MCI.  
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Adapted from Google Earth, https://www.google.com/maps/place/
Salinas+Valley+State+Prison/@36.4783956,-121.3756374,914m/
data=!3m1!1e3!4m5!3m4!1s0x8092676e3f14b3ad:0xd97c25baefe4abbe!8m2!3d36.4792
253!4d-121.3742578, accessed September 8, 2019. 
Figure 1. Aerial Map of SVSP 
Prison MCIs will likely also gain the immediate attention of the media, with one 
such incident documenting eight television news crews as well as contact from 10 
newspapers and two radio stations.176 While prisons may already have a designated media 
staging area, the SVSP example suggests the limited staging space for emergency vehicles 
may be in conflict with the designated media staging area.  
Another potential resource-staging problem is rotary-wing air ambulances. Remote 
prisons with limited outside medical resources or any facility served by air medical services 
must also consider these resources, as numerous after action reports describe medical 
evacuation by helicopter. Due to overhead obstructions and space requirements such as 
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safety setbacks required by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), emergency 
helicopter landing sites are not likely to be located within the secured perimeter.177 
Meeting FAA requirements for a designated helipad or even an emergency helicopter 
landings site represents another planning challenge with the potential to further compound 
the emergency vehicle staging problem if not addressed in local plans.178  
Once these outside agencies arrive at the prison, doctrine prescribes the 
establishment of a unified command. As prior incidents have shown, agencies that have 
not trained together or prepared to operate jointly are likely to repeat the same unified 
command issues as seen in previous events. While SVSP’s administration building is 
outside the secured perimeter, this is not the case with other prisons; those inside the secure 
perimeter are not easily accessible to other agencies. Doctrine advises emergency planners 
to consider the appropriate location for a command post with sufficient space and 
equipment to manage the event jointly and accommodate the agencies involved. The arrival 
of mobile command vehicles may further complicate matters, especially in light of physical 
space limitations and challenges to communication connectivity and interoperability.  
In addition to managing the resource staging and movement outside of the prison, 
managing the medical crisis inside the prison presents a host of planning concerns. For 
example, a routine medical emergency stemming from inmate violence may involve two 
inmates or two groups of inmates engaged in either mutual combat or an assault. This 
immediately attracts the attention of the prison guards, who summon additional staff by 
way of whistles, alarms, or other methods such as radios. Responding officers approach 
the melee, deploying non-lethal weapons to gain compliance and commanding the fighting 
inmates to lie down on the ground; as the inmates begin lying down in the prone position, 
it is quickly evident that one or several inmates, now lying on the ground, are bleeding 
profusely. Extrication of inmate-patients from the prison yard, surrounded by inmates who 
moments ago were fighting, presents an active risk to the responders. Although the incident 
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appears to have stabilized for the moment and the guards have gained compliance, the 
violence can reignite quickly and without warning. Response procedures may include 
tactics such as a rescue circle, where armed correctional staff protect and encircle the 
wounded, allowing the removal of the injured inmates from the prison yard and evacuation 
to a clinic. If the severity of injuries requires a higher level of care, then the patients are 
moved to awaiting ambulances.  
Active shooter response guidance such as the Hartford mnemonic THREAT 
prescribes hemorrhage control, extrication to safety, assembling the wounded at a casualty 
collection point or a single location to assemble patients for assessment and triage, and 
transportation to treatment.179 Unlike active shooter incidents, which primarily consist of 
gunshot wounds, prison MCI injuries will generally involve stabbing and slashing or blunt 
force-striking trauma. However, the emphasis on extrication and treatment is generally the 
same. 
Overseeing 50 or even 10 patients in a secured facility with limited access and 
movement while managing an active threat present a very complicated crisis. Unlike MCIs 
that occur in public areas, the persistent threat of prison violence and active combat may 
continue for hours as prison staff face the challenges of balancing responder safety with 
patient care. While the prison medical clinic typically serves as the casualty collection point 
for smaller incidents, the volume of injuries requiring hemorrhage control and immediate 
attention may necessitate a more serious response. Medical staff who generally operate in 
a clinical environment may find themselves transitioning to the role of first responder and 
triaging patients closer to the incident. Additionally, if the prison has not undergone 
formalized MCI planning, then a standardized triage process will also not likely be in place. 
MCI events can overwhelm prison medical staff and exceed available space in the prison 
medical clinic, yet the prison’s security barriers and procedures often prevent outside 
responders such as medical personnel from working inside. Clinics within large facilities 
such as SVSP are deep within the complex, convenient for daily prison operations yet far 
from an exterior access point. Augmenting on-site medical staff with outside responders, 
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while logical under doctrine, is extremely difficult to overcome in light of access and 
security concerns. Restricted site access and movement limitations also raises concerns 
about patient evacuation.  
With the limited interior roads and minimal space to maneuver vehicles, large and 
restrictive facilities such as SVSP will also have to contend with the challenges getting the 
patients to the ambulances. While it may be possible to guide a single ambulance or other 
transport vehicles deep into the facility, an MCI will require the movement of multiple 
non-ambulatory patients. Guiding an ambulance inside usually presumes the active threat 
has subsided sufficiently to allow outside medical responders to enter, which may not be 
the case for larger, protracted events. As an alternate course of action, moving non-
ambulatory patients to awaiting ambulances nearly three-quarters of a mile away requires 
either vehicles or a sufficient supply of rolling gurneys, as well as enough staff to complete 
the patient relay. If air medical resources deploy, the location of helipads may increase this 
distance even farther.  
In addition to gurneys for patient movement, it is also critical to stockpile sufficient 
quantities of medical supplies necessary to support an MCI event. This was not only a 
noted deficiency in the 2009 CIM incident but also a recommendation identified in both 
doctrine and professional journals.180 If conventional planning doctrine and professional 
journals recommends the establishment of MCI caches for fixed, mass-gathering locations 
such as schools and stadiums, this certainly merits further evaluation as a planning issue 
for prisons.181  
The purpose of this thesis is to answer the question: How can a framework be 
developed that will improve prison mass-casualty planning and response? The overall 
planning gaps seen across the corrections enterprise, coupled with the lack of prison-
specific planning guidance, indicates that a significant problem exists. To answer the 
research question, this chapter explored emergency management doctrine, professional 
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publications, and actual MCI events with the intent of both validating the need for and 
developing a framework to improve prison MCI planning and response. The desired 
performance outcomes and critical MCI planning and response gaps extracted and 
extrapolated from these mostly non-prison sources, when viewed through the lens of the 
prison operational environment, presents a well-defined yet theoretical representation of 
the problem space. Each of these 24 planning areas identify multiple issues that merit 
further examination for developing the prison MCI planning framework.  
1. Joint pre-incident planning 
2. Difficulties interfacing with first responders 
3. Notification, dispatch, and call routing 
4. Recognizing and reporting MCI  
5. Operating as a unified command 
6. Integration of medical responders 
7. Use of a functional, (joint) incident command post 
8. Interoperable communications  
9. Responders unable to access secure facility 
10. Signage and clear building numbers 
11. Emergency vehicle movement 
12. Resource staging 
13. Site management 
14. Media staging 
15. Triage areas and casualty collection points 
16. Non-ambulatory patient movement 
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17. EMS access to internal triage areas 
18. Ambulance movement, loading, and access 
19. Medical caches and MCI supplies 
20. Helipads 
21. Standardized triage method 
22. Role of prison medical staff 
23. Active threat rescue tactics 
24. Medical surge and credentialing outside medical personnel 
If this restated problem and description of the problem space is accurate, then it 








III. VALIDATING THE PROPOSED FRAMEWORK 
In 2013, Islamic extremist brothers Tamerlan and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev placed 
improvised explosive devices (IED) near the finish line of the Boston Marathon, setting off 
one of the largest MCIs to occur on U.S. soil in decades.182 A FEMA lessons-learned 
bulletin reported, “Both IEDs consisted of pressure cookers concealed in backpacks with 
low-grade explosives, nails, shards of metal, and ball bearings.”183 Positioned 200 yards 
apart and detonated in succession, the shrapnel blasts killed three spectators and injured 
264.184 Although the injuries of some victims were so severe that they required limb 
amputations, it is important to note that none of the casualties transported lost their lives.185 
This successful outcome was no coincidence; the Boston emergency management 
community spent the prior year conducting extensive planning and analysis in anticipation 
of several likely catastrophic scenarios.186 Employing select elements of these same 
planning strategies can help solve the challenge of developing a prison mass-casualty 
framework.  
This chapter validates and refines the data from the gap analysis by employing a 
modified Delphi technique with a panel of subject matter experts from the corrections field. 
The chapter begins with a brief introduction of the concept of exercise wargaming and an 
examination of the planning activities attributed to the successful outcomes from the 
Boston Marathon bombings. A narrative of the discussions and outcomes from the 
modified Delphi technique follows, which includes a discussion-based exercise with 
wargaming elements based on examples from the Boston incident. This chapter concludes 
with a presentation of the proposed prison mass-casualty-planning framework. 
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A. DOCTRINE, EXERCISE, AND PLANNING 
Federal emergency management doctrine occupies a prominent role throughout this 
thesis, and it would be remiss to exclude mention of the doctrinal emphasis on training and 
exercise as a planning tool. In addition to the systems and models previously discussed, 
FEMA’s emergency management doctrine also provides the guidance and methods for 
response organizations to exercise their emergency plans.187 Ranging from low-stress 
events such as discussion-based exercises in a classroom environment to full-scale, live 
simulations involving role players and choreographed special effects, these events provide 
a venue to both train response personnel and test emergency plans. Having discovered any 
unanticipated planning weaknesses or gaps in training proficiency, the organization has an 
opportunity to correct those issues before the actual crisis occurs.  
One such training venue, perhaps the most common, is the tabletop exercise. The 
tabletop exercise methodology practiced today is strikingly similar to the ages-old military 
practice of creating a scale terrain model or using maps and drawings to provide a visual 
depiction of the battlefield. Now commonly referred to as wargaming by the U.S. military, 
the modern approach effectively presents a model of the operational environment, which 
may even include the more modern operational constraints such as laws, regulations, and 
policy.188 In one possible format, an exercise facilitator may guide participants through a 
turn-based scenario to rehearse response action and deconflict operations following an 
action-reaction-counteraction exchange.189 These methods have proven to be invaluable 
planning tools for testing procedures, planning assumptions, and aiding decision-makers 
in developing solutions and predicting outcomes, as the Boston incident demonstrates. 
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B. WHAT PRISON PLANNERS CAN LEARN FROM THE 2013 BOSTON 
MARATHON BOMBING 
In preparation for the annual Boston Marathon, Boston’s emergency management 
community had to resolve many planning and logistics challenges, including the issue of 
managing emergency medical response while contending with over 17,000 runners and 
500,000 spectators crowding 26 miles of public streets.190 Additionally, the marathon itself 
required enough medical responders to provide aid to an estimated 1,000 people during 
just the first six hours of the race.191 The city’s EMS personnel augmented the staffing in 
first aid tents along the race route in addition to managing their usual, daily load of 
emergency calls, ensuring continued EMS coverage of both the city and the event.192 
However, ambulance responses near the race path would have to negotiate numerous 
closed off streets packed with heavy crowds and somehow bypass the massive obstacle 
created by the marathon.193  
Following the whole community approach prescribed in doctrine, state, local, and 
regional planning partners conducted several key planning activities in the years leading 
up to the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing. This included the development of a statewide 
communications interoperability plan to improve communications between law 
enforcement, fire, and EMS agencies, and regional MCI planning with hospitals and EMS 
providers.194 To test these plans, they conducted a full-scale, 24-hour exercise involving 
over 50 partner agencies.195 In preparation for the annual marathon, the planning team 
analyzed after action reports from previous year’s events and the reports from those 
multiple joint agency exercises to identify specific issues that would need to be resolved. 
State emergency officials also conducted an intensive tabletop exercise specifically for the 
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Boston Marathon, reviewing the lessons learned from those previous events and 
wargaming various response scenarios.196  
With streets closed along the race route and packed with spectators, emergency 
egress routes to specific hospitals had to be pre-determined along with the strategic 
placement of medical resources.197 In the midst of a bloody and chaotic terror attack, first 
responders successfully evacuated 264 patients within 45 minutes. The prior 
communication exercises and detailed medical planning facilitated rapid and efficient 
patient distribution to hospital emergency rooms, reducing patient backlogs and delays in 
care. While no one could have predicted the horrific attack that lay ahead, the incredible 
response to this MCI is a testament to both the importance and utility of planning and 
wargaming.198 The New England Journal of Medicine described these detailed planning 
efforts and the successful execution as a “planned mass-casualty event.”199  
As permanent, fixed locations, prisons can certainly benefit from following a 
similar approach and essentially “pre-planning” their MCI events. Just as wargaming 
requires an accurate representation of the operational environment, developing an accurate 
and detailed prison MCI plan requires a thorough understanding of the problem space. The 
Boston planning team relied on after action reports from previous year’s events and 
multiple joint agency exercises in order to gain an understanding of their problem space; 
prisons, however, appear to generally lack this background information. Previous authors 
have discussed the lack of emergency planning efforts across the corrections enterprise, as 
well as the lack of readily available discipline-specific planning guidance. When taken into 
account along with the outcomes of prison MCI events and prison emergencies in general, 
it is highly probable that prison officials lack a clear understanding of the problem space. 
Presenting them with a framework that accurately reflects the problems to be overcome 
may bridge this gap.  
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To validate this model and the results of the gap analysis, an expert panel was 
presented with a survey, a discussion-based exercise, and a facilitated participant out-brief 
following a modified Delphi method.200 The participants that comprised this expert panel 
consisted of eight correctional staff, ranging in rank from correctional sergeants to 
lieutenants and captains. Their current and previous positions included overseeing alarm 
response and alarm response training, developing emergency plans and procedures, as well 
as managing several emergency aspect of prison operations, including some who have 
served as the institution watch commander. Although these correctional staff collectively 
represent five California state prisons, all of them have previously worked at other state 
prisons throughout their respective careers; these experiences provided additional 
perspective and insight into a greater number of facilities, physical layouts, and planning 
challenges without necessitating a larger panel. In addition to the correctional staff, two 
emergency planners from the state office of emergency services also participated, one of 
whom holds several years’ experience in prison emergency planning. 
To gauge individual perceptions of MCI preparedness, and to introduce the expert 
panel members to the discussion topics ahead, panel members independently completed an 
initial survey. A brief scenario involving a prison MCI event served as the backdrop to 
frame questions about current plans, local planning efforts, and the participants’ perception 
of current preparedness. Participants briefly described NIMS and ICS elements that they 
envisioned would be successful as well as those requiring substantial improvement based 
on participants’ current perceptions of preparedness. The group’s general consensus 
showed high confidence in their ability to respond to daily emergencies and less confidence 
in their ability to interface with outside responders and integrate those agencies into a larger 
prison emergency. Many indicated support for additional or increased collaboration with 
their local response agencies. This feedback was noted as potential topics to be included in 
the subsequent panel discussions.  
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In the second Delphi iteration, the panel participated in a facilitated discussion 
formatted as a tabletop, wargaming exercise (see Appendix B).201 The gap analysis 
identified trends and issues that first responders have experienced during MCI events and 
examined those issues in the context of a typical prison, forming a theoretical model of the 
problem space. Similarly, the operational environment modeled for this exercise was also 
an actual state prison; participants were constrained by the current plans, procedures, and 
tactics staff would use to respond to an evolving prison MCI event, but they were 
encouraged to discuss methods to improve these constraints. To better illustrate the 
scenario, the panel was provided with a 60-inch-by-60-inch aerial photo of the facility 
(Figure 2) and visual aids that included model ambulances and a fire apparatus to move 
about the map while discussing potential solutions. Each phase of the MCI scenario 
presented several actions; panel members responded by describing their reactions to the 
crisis in terms of current plans and procedures. Throughout the discussion, panel members 
were asked follow-on questions about issues from the gap analysis and the feedback 
received from the initial survey. When the panel concurred that an issue was in fact a 
planning gap or a problem, the facilitator would encourage a discussion of potential 
solutions. Wargaming discussions were unconstrained by issues such as budget or current 
policies, and participants were encouraged to discuss any relevant experiences that might 
enhance the discourse.  
201 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program 




Figure 2. Tabletop Exercise Map and Vehicle Props 
C. RESULTS OF THE TABLETOP EXERCISE 
The exercise modules included notification and initial response, unified command, 
resource staging and reception, and patient triage and extraction. The results of this exercise 
form a case study, revealing corrections-specific issues directly tied to the gap analysis. 
While the views, concerns, and recommendations of this panel may not precisely portray 
all prisons, they do provide an accurate snapshot similar to FEMA’s lessons learned white 
papers that legitimizes many planning and response issues. This section summarizes the 
panel’s key discussion elements and recommendations specific to the development of the 
framework.  
1. Module 1: Notification and Initial Response 
In the opening scenario, escalating tensions between rival inmate groups has 
resulted in increased incidents of inmate violence, eventually leading to a large-scale 
inmate riot that quickly escalates to an MCI. The discussion focused on how staff typically 
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react to such an incident, how they communicate critical information, and they determine 
that such an event may be an MCI during the initial response.  
Small-scale disturbances and calls for an ambulance are routine occurrences in 
prisons, potentially reoccurring several times per day.202 As such, both custody and 
medical staff are frequently summoned to respond without clear indication of the incident 
of which they are about to become a party. The panel reported that during these opening 
moments of an incident, information passed from the specific location of the disturbance 
to the watch commander might not readily include sufficient information to indicate that 
an MCI has occurred or is in progress. Depending on the extent of the injuries, some 
protocols call for the watch commander to dial the ambulance provider directly rather than 
use 911, effectively bypassing the situational awareness that triggers automatic mutual aid 
systems managed by local governments. Purportedly this is especially common at prisons 
located in smaller towns served by a single ambulance provider where staff habitually call 
the sole ambulance provider directly.203  
Internal phone systems and non-standard dialing procedures appear to create 
another gap in the notification process. Similar to colleges and military bases with an 
internal phone network, some jails and prisons may have an internal emergency number 
that contacts a supervisor or a watch desk rather than the outside 911 system. The use of 
cellular phones further complicates this issue, as 911 calls placed from a cellular phone 
anywhere in California are likely answered by a central dispatch center operated by 
California Highway Patrol (CHP). Based on information the caller provides, the dispatcher 
forwards the call to a local dispatch center or sheriff’s office closest to the emergency.204 
As prior incidents have documented, multiple methods for reporting an emergency presents 
openings where communication delays and lack of information can potentially delay the 
mobilization of ambulances from surrounding jurisdictions and hinder the establishment of 
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a common operating picture among response agencies. This leads back to the issue of 
recognizing that an incident has evolved into an MCI.  
None of the correctional panel members were aware of a specific threshold for 
declaring an MCI at their facility or within their region. Several panelists felt the threshold 
might be “five or more”; however, they were unaware of the source. This appeared to be a 
popular rumor among correctional staff and not tied to any specific training. While the 
panel agreed the watch commander would likely assume the role of incident commander 
and holds the responsibility for declaring an MCI, there are no specific policies or 
procedures that specifies actions to take during such an occurrence. As the situation 
develops and additional information is communicated up to the watch desk, the commander 
simply calls for additional ambulances. The lack of training and policy for managing and 
MCI represents a major response gap.  
One of the prisons represented in this panel has formed a unique relationship with 
their local fire department that bears mentioning, as it presents a novel solution to bridging 
this gap and is supported by several doctrinal concepts. It was reported that during large 
incidents that require an outside medical response, the responding local battalion fire chief 
often assumes a role similar to the incident commander, assigning ambulances to specific 
hospitals and providing situational awareness to the regional disaster medical system. 
Generally, it is up to local first responders to provide this situational awareness to the 
regional disaster medical system and alert hospitals of an MCI event. This particular prison 
has come to rely on that local fire chief to assess their crisis, declare the MCI, and request 
MCI-specific resources. It was the panel’s conclusion that this relationship and the roles 
assumed by the fire chief is a potential model or solution that merits further exploration. 
Additionally, most California prisons have an on-site firehouse; panel members suggested 
that the prison’s fire chief or captain could have a role during large-scale medical 
emergencies, both declaring the MCI and directing outside medical resources.205 
According to the panel, medical staff should also have a more active role.  
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Panel members collectively agreed that disturbance control training occupies a 
prominent place in custody staff’s emergency procedures training, but is lacking an 
integrated emergency medical component. When certain security threats or emergency 
conditions warrant a response, an alarm is activated and staff react according to their 
response protocols; this is not necessarily the case with medical emergencies. When prison 
disturbances result in serious injuries, as they often do, the response tactics must transition 
from disturbance control to emergency medical response. However, due to what they 
viewed as disparities in policy or enforcement of policy, the prison medical staff primarily 
serves as the prison’s on-site clinical providers and not as first responders. Reportedly, the 
current practice is for correctional staff to extract the injured inmates from the prison yard 
and assist moving them to the clinic for further evaluation and treatment. While this may 
be sufficient for small disturbances, a prison MCI requires disturbance control measures 
and the activation of medical staff to perform both triage and medical management.  
The panel discussed several solutions that would improve these gaps and suggested 
that alarm response procedures should also include staging pre-identified medical 
personnel along with their aid bags, additional backboards, and radios. In anticipation of 
the transition to emergency medical response, medical supervisors and gurneys would 
follow closely behind, ready to establish a triage. This shift from clinicians to medical first 
responders would also require the development of policies and tactics to integrate them 
into alarm response as well as require equipment purchases and training. The patient triage 
and extraction module later in the exercise echoed many of these similar issues.  
2. Module 2: Unified Command 
In the unified command module, the incident has escalated beyond the ability of 
the prison to respond. Outside fire and law enforcement agencies as well as multiple EMS 
providers are en route to the prison. The key discussion elements focus on those issues 
associated with establishing a unified command in a secured facility and working jointly 
with response partners.  
In the previous module, the panel confirmed agency-wide adoption of ICS; 
however, the members generally resist the idea of operating jointly under a unified 
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command. They agree with the doctrinal intent, method, and necessity of a unified 
command approach; however, they felt that outside response agencies lacked sufficient 
understanding of their prisons to integrate into their incident. The panel uniformly agreed 
that increased joint planning efforts and training with outside fire and EMS agencies is 
necessary to overcome these deficiencies and prepare for major incidents. Until this occurs, 
multiple factors hamper the establishment of a unified response, including the limitations 
of their current incident command posts. 
Describing the locations designated as the command posts for their respective 
prisons confirmed a clear disparity in locations, size, and accessibility from prison to 
prison. A conference room in an administrative building frequently serves this purpose 
during emergencies, while others may use a classroom. These are reported to have worked 
well for smaller, short-duration events but in most cases would not accommodate more 
than a few additional personnel, making multi-agency coordination difficult. In many 
cases, the facility’s design places the command post within the secured perimeter, which 
further limits accessibility by outside responders. In a few rare cases, the training building 
with classroom space sits in a publicly available location such as the prison parking lot. 
These rooms or facilities are typically not equipped to serve as a command post, as they 
generally lack critical features such as additional phone lines to accommodate the 
command staff or data connections for their computers. Cell phones often augment the 
limited connectivity, later creating additional communications problems as staff rotate and 
take their assigned phone with them.  
 Panel members also mentioned that as a method of assuring radio communications 
between the prison and outside agencies, it has become standard practice for a responding 
fire department to hand off a radio with the watch commander upon arrival. They anticipate 
that an agency-wide radio upgrade, currently planned, will resolve these types of 
interoperability issues.  
3. Module 3: Resource Reception and Staging 
In the resource reception and staging module, a massive wave of resources has 
descended upon the prison, bringing multiple ambulances, fire apparatus, and law 
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enforcement vehicles, as well as several news vans from local networks. The scale of the 
incident has also necessitated the deployment of air ambulances. This module examines 
the task of organizing and managing the incident site.  
Responding to the scenario, panel members identified an outside parking lot as the 
location where incoming emergency vehicles are directed to stage while awaiting direction 
from prison staff. The panel explained that there is no established policy or procedure for 
receiving a large quantity of resources for an MCI or any other major type of incident. They 
anticipate staff will instinctively receive the first arriving fire apparatus or ambulance in 
the same manner as a smaller, routine incident by directing them to the patient loading zone 
or in the direction of the housing unit in peril. In their collective experience, staging does 
not truly occur until several emergency response vehicles arrive and begin to restrict 
vehicle movement, at which point the watch commander will appoint a staff member to 
direct traffic. In the absence of a staff member performing the role of staging area manager, 
one of the first responders may begin organizing the staging area and directing traffic until 
a prison staff member assumes these duties. The panel promptly recognized that the 
quantity and types of arriving emergency response vehicles, parked around the employees’ 
vehicles, would easily exceed the limited capacity of the parking lot and prevent employees 
from leaving until after the incident was over. Additionally, the street design and traffic 
flow into and around this particular prison would likely lead many vehicles directly to a 
guarded entrance where most vehicles are directed to U-turn and route back to the 
employee parking lot and staging area. This may be a simple maneuver for cars and service 
vehicles; however, large vehicles such as a fire apparatus will unavoidably block this single 
ingress and egress point while attempting to maneuver back to the staging area, further 
restricting emergency vehicle movement. The limited vehicle space also forces all 
emergency vehicles to “stack up” in the parking lot in single lanes, restricted to first-in, 
first-out movement with little or no room to bypass.  
Using the aerial photo and model vehicles, the panel war-gamed potential solutions 
to the vehicle staging and ambulance route problems. First, they re-created the current 
staging area and reiterated the specific problems that required resolution. Through some 
trial and deliberation, they recommended that the original location be used solely to stage 
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media and identified an alternate location to stage incoming first responders. This new 
model for traffic flow and staging provided sufficient space, allowed emergency vehicles 
to drive straight in, rather than turn around at the gate, and eliminated the first-in first-out 
channeling that occurred with the currently designated staging area. The panel also 
discussed additional solutions such as ways to resolve the confusion of arriving at an 
unfamiliar location. The prison could adopt a strategy similar to large facilities that operate 
a supply warehouse or a shipping and receiving area with loading docks that may have 
signs directing delivery trucks to a designated ingress route. With clear signage and marked 
routes that direct first responders along designated emergency ingress and egress routes, 
the responders could also bypass congested employee parking areas filled with passenger 
vehicles. 
In discussing the key point of this phase further, the panel assured that all prisons 
have pre-identified staging areas for media and emergency vehicles as well as helipads for 
life-flight response. Participants could easily recall their own prisons’ designated staging 
locations; however, having just completed the wargaming exercise, they were also quick 
to caution that their staging areas have not been analyzed or tested in the context of a major 
influx of emergency vehicles. Discussing their experiences at other prisons, participants 
also reported incidents of first responders being easily confused about where to report or 
how to navigate through a facility when responding to a routine emergency call. While 
some facilities have a guard station to receive incoming traffic, most have a road that leads 
to an open parking lot similar to the SVSP example in Figure 1. The panel commented that 
prison design centers on security and limited ingress and egress points, which is why 
current prison facilities have not taken into account these emergency-planning 
considerations. Awareness of these issues may be improving, as several members 
highlighted a recent success story about identifying this problem during the design of a 
new facility.  
As of this writing, California State Prison, Sacramento, is planning construction of 
a larger, centralized medical clinic, which will also replace several smaller clinics 
throughout the prison. Any inmate going to an outside hospital for emergency medical care 
will be processed through this single point into an awaiting ambulance. The construction 
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plans originally included a road with a T-shaped intersection for the patient loading zone, 
requiring all arriving ambulances to stop and back-in to a set of double doors. While this 
may be acceptable for a single patient pickup, it repeats many of the patient-loading 
problems experienced during MCI events. Officials recognized the design flaw early in the 
construction process and replaced the T-shaped intersection with a large, circular loading 
zone. During an MCI, ambulances will be able to stage for patient pickup similar to the 
taxi line at an airport, thereby eliminating unnecessary delays. This serves as a prime 
example of how facility design should take into account emergency planning 
considerations. It was later reported that this prison is also considering signage along the 
ambulance routes as a direct result of this thesis and the wargaming exercise.  
4. Module 4: Patient Triage and Extraction 
In this module, the incident has grown beyond the prison’s ability to treat patients, 
requiring the establishment of a triage area and the extraction of multiple non-ambulatory 
patients to ambulances and life-flight helicopters. As the closing module, this module 
continued several previous discussion topics such as interoperable communication and 
resource staging and inquired about triage methods and caches of MCI supplies. This 
module concluded with brief discussions about fatality management and medical surge 
issues.  
With alarm response procedures still playing a central role in the scenario while 
also transitioning to emergency medical response, earlier discussions about incorporating 
medical responders into alarm response procedures led to lengthy discussion about 
response tactics as well as gaps or inconsistencies in policy. Similar to the earlier 
wargaming exercise, panel members used a dry-erase board to illustrate and discuss tactics. 
First, they demonstrated disturbance control measures and tactics currently used to rescue 
and remove injured inmates or staff from an active threat environment such as a prison 
yard. Next, citing their collective experience and current active shooter response training 
calls for a joint police and medical response, they discussed how this model could be 
adapted to prison emergency medical response. Building on the earlier recommendations 
to stage medical staff and supplies automatically when the alarm sounds, they discussed 
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how this group of medical responders could follow behind the disturbance control team 
without prompting and shorten to transition to medical response. This proposed response 
model, however ideal, faces several roadblocks.  
Some assume that the medical personnel’s reluctance to leave the clinic out of 
concerns for their personal safety is the primary underlying issue behind the earlier reported 
disparities in medical response policy and procedures; after all, it is a high-risk environment 
and the potential always exists for violence to flare up again. Others assert that medical and 
custody staff always train separately at their prisons; yet others still have developed joint 
drills and employed their own methods in actual incidents. Whether the issue is personal 
safety or personal preference, they all agree that there is no single, uniform policy to drive 
response tactics across all facilities. It is also evident that these local procedures have an 
unexpected trickle-down effect on the selection of triage areas. 
As the panel explained, standard procedures immediately following a riot includes 
maintaining a certain separation between the two opposing groups, as tensions remain high 
and attempts at retaliatory attacks are common. In the moments immediately following a 
violent riot-turned-MCI, even the wounded cannot share a single triage area, necessitating 
the establishment of two separate areas. While clinics can triage a few injuries, they lack 
the space of a hospital emergency room and have limited beds. Facility design, security 
levels, and the distance between the site of the MCI and the clinic can further compound 
the problem. With the problems clearly identified, the participants were challenged find a 
solution.  
Admittedly, the watch commander/incident commander selects these areas based 
on immediate need, convenience, and without specific regard to the proximity of the 
ambulances. While custody staff showed a clear preference for triaging on the prison yard 
rather than transporting injured inmates to the clinic, they also grudgingly mentioned that 
inclement weather conditions are very common occurrences that require shifting to an 
alternate venue. They concurred that designating an available, large indoor space such as a 
gymnasium as the primary triage area would provide shelter from the elements and enough 
space for both factions without splitting up the medical staff between two separate 
locations. However, in the context of the exercise scenario this would require a lengthy 
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patient move due to the distance from the incident. Shifting to questions about managing 
the movement of non-ambulatory inmates for triage and then to ambulances or a helicopter, 
prison layout and available resources were again, key factors. For the prison used in this 
scenario, moving multiple non-ambulatory inmates strapped to backboards would quickly 
exhaust the minimal supply of gurneys in the clinic, requiring four or more staff members 
to carry the remaining patients or load them into any available vehicle capable of moving 
them. While the prison does have access to a helipad, it is located on a hilltop over one 
mile away next to a sister institution. If this prison’s MCI event musters medical air 
resources, moving patients to the helipad will present additional logistics challenges. As a 
policy recommendation, the panel suggested that emergency planners should examine the 
prison as a series of smaller elements due to these prisons’ enormous size, designating 
triage areas and staging supplies for each housing unit. Spreading out resources and quickly 
shifting them as needed allows the watch commander/incident commander to decide which 
areas to use based on the situation, providing greater flexibility than relying on a central 
location. With some additional planning, they could also incorporate patient evacuation 
into these areas.  
An incident of this size has the potential to quickly exhaust or exceed the ability of 
prison medical staff to provide treatment, resulting in a large number of medical transports 
to outside hospitals. The prison in this scenario is located nearly adjacent to a sister 
institution and additional medical staff are just minutes away; however, many other prisons 
are not nearly as fortunate. For the discussion on medical surge capacity, panel members 
were asked to assume this prison had no near counterpart and they were forced to rely on 
local resources. The CIM incident was mentioned as an example of how the department 
managed this problem before, and the panel was asked to provide their opinion of that 
event’s outcomes. They agreed that this situation presented a difficult and uncomfortable 
paradox; outside medical providers cannot come in, and inmates should not go out. When 
the CIM incident occurred, a majority considered moving inmates outside of the secure 
perimeter and performing joint triage in the prison parking a risky choice, and still criticize 
that decision to this day; however, in doing so, prison managers may have stumbled upon 
the solution to connecting EMS responders with patients and augmenting prison medical 
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personnel.206 The panel cautioned against making this a standing policy without further 
analysis; however, they all agreed that when an incident of this magnitude occurs, the 
incident commander must make decisions, and prioritize access, patient movement, safety, 
and security.  
The panel also suggested that MCI plans include considerations for patient tracking 
and staff accountability after they depart for the hospital, as this task is especially 
challenging during a crisis. Injured inmates are loaded into ambulances along with a 
supervising officer, or an assigned officer follows the ambulance in a chase vehicle. With 
multiple hospitals receiving patients, the ambulance’s destination may be undetermined 
when it is departing, or it may change en route as hospitals prioritize based on the extent 
of the injuries. The panel discussed their experiences with having a single staff member 
assigned to track patients and staff during these major events and nominated specific staff 
positions to assume this role automatically during an emergency. This led to a follow-on 
discussion about pre-designating other emergency roles; for example, a staff member 
whose daily duties include purchasing and procurement could have a pre-designated ICS 
role as the logistics chief, with those emergency duties delineated in the employee’s job 
description or duty statement. During an emergency, that staff member automatically 
transitions to their ICS role without waiting for the incident commander to direct them. 
This method could streamline the initial activation phase and alleviate numerous planning 
and response issues by placing a trained staff member in that response role. 
The exercise concluded with brief recap, the outcomes of the wargaming sessions, 
and the panel’s recommendations. Panel members were given the opportunity to provide 
any last-minute feedback or further discuss any issue they felt remained unresolved. 
Although the panel was convened for purpose of conducting research, the panel members 
commented that similar wargaming exercises complemented by full-scale training 
scenarios should be instituted in policy and conducted regularly. They found this event to 
be a very useful planning tool, especially when it came to developing solutions with staff 
from other prisons and comparing best practices.  
                                                 
206 Interview with anonymous prison official, Chino Riot, January 2018. 
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5. Panel’s Review of the Proposed Framework 
The following framework, developed from the research findings and outcomes of 
the tabletop exercise, was presented to each of the panel members individually for 
comment and as a final check on consensus.  
1. A Policy formally adopting the National Incident Management System 
(NIMS) and the Incident Command System (ICS). If such a policy does 
not currently exist, developing a policy that formally declares an agency’s 
adoption of federal standards is an ideal starting point for developing local 
emergency plans and bringing a facility into compliance. It also serves as 
a justification to support training and other requirements.  
2. ICS and NIMS training plan. Identify general NIMS and ICS training 
requirements for all personnel, as well as position-specific training 
requirements.  
3. Establish in policy annual training requirements.  
4. Initiate pre-event planning discussions with local fire, EMS, law 
enforcement, emergency management agencies, and representatives from 
the disaster medical system. If applicable, invite representatives from air 
ambulance providers.  
5. Provide a facility tour. Orient outside responders to the facility. Review 
facility access procedures, patient-loading procedures, and directions to 
the facility medical clinic or ambulance loading area.  
6. Identify or propose areas for emergency vehicle staging. Solicit input from 
local response agencies about their specific space requirements. 
7. Identify location of incident command post. Notify partner agencies of 
relevant policies or security protocols, such as the prohibition of firearms, 
knives, and personal cell phones on facility grounds. 
8. Unified command. Discuss how a unified command will be implemented. 
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9. Joint training opportunities. Suggest joint participation in future training 
and exercise events. Host joint exercises, and invite outside agencies to 
participate in facility exercises.  
10. Resource reception, staging, and integration. Develop plans and 
procedures to receive and stage emergency vehicles. Review physical 
layout, parking lots, traffic patterns, access points, and available space. 
11. Include the assignment of a staging area manager in emergency plans. 
Ensure staging area manager will have communications with the incident 
command post and is easily identifiable to arriving emergency vehicles. 
(high-visibility safety vests or other method of identification)  
12. Ingress and egress routes. Uninterrupted, one-way traffic routes with 
single points of entry and exit that avoids congested parking lots.  
13. Designated staging area. Sufficient size to stage and maneuver appropriate 
quantities of emergency vehicles.  
14. Signs and road markings to indicate routes. Install permanent signs to alert 
responders to staging areas or ambulance routes; make available 
temporary signage and traffic cones to designate temporarily route traffics 
or parking areas.  
15. Update facility road designs to make maximum use of roundabouts or 
circular pick-up zones, replacing T-shaped intersections that require 
ambulances to back-up for loading. 
16. Emergency helipads. If the facility is served by air ambulance services, 
consider potential emergency landing sites. Ensure predesignated sites do 
not conflict with emergency vehicle staging or traffic routes. Consider 
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constructing permanent helipads; consult with Federal Aviation 
Administration for construction standards.207  
17. Media staging. Separate from resource staging and away from the incident 
command post. Assign a public information officer or other staff to liaison 
with the media. 
18. Communications interoperability. Engage local planners and ensure the 
facility is included in local public safety radio interoperability plans.  
19. Ensure the facility’s radios have the ability to communicate via local 
public safety channels, to include emergency medical services. 
20. Ensure communications plans account for prison areas with poor radio 
reception.  
21. Notification and common operating picture. Timely notification of 
response partners and the activation of mass-casualty resources are 
critical; include the agencies and methods of notification in facility 
policies and procedures.  
22. Declaring an MCI. Determine the local MCI threshold and procedures for 
declaring an MCI; develop facility policy or procedures for activation of 
MCI plan.  
23. Hospitals. (determine local procedures or ) Establish policy to notify area 
hospitals of the facility’s MCI. 
24. Mass-casualty mutual aid. Include a directory of mass-casualty mutual aid 
resources in the facility emergency plan, and establish a process for 
requesting mutual aid.  
                                                 
207 Federal Aviation Administration, Heliport Design. 
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25. Facility incident command post.  
26. Accessible. Location allows outside agencies to access the command post 
without passing through security barriers, or establish procedures to bring 
these agencies inside. 
27. Appropriate space. Large enough to accommodate a unified command 
consisting of local response partners. 
28. Equipment. Sufficient workspace and phone lines to accommodate the 
unified command structure.  
29. Predesignate key ICS positions by assigning appropriate facility positions 
and staff to ICS roles. (For example, the facility Watch Commander will 
also serve as Incident Commander.)  
30. Update employee duty statements. Develop a policy to include these 
emergency responsibilities in employee’s duty statements/job descriptions 
and ensure employees receive ICS training for their emergency roles. 
31. Triage area, casualty collection point, and ambulance loading areas. 
Consider capacity and capability of facility medical clinic and location in 
relation to housing units and yards. Consider access for outside fire and 
EMS personnel.  
32. Triage areas. Designate areas for patient triage; consider dividing 
combatants into two triage separate areas. If designated area is outdoors, 
consider inclement weather plan. 
33. Casualty collection point. Designate a location to assemble patients for 
transport, if separate from triage areas.  
34. Ambulance loading area. Consider if using a separate casualty collection 
point. 
35. Develop policy to provide security for medical staff.  
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36. Patient movement plan. Plan to move non-ambulatory or impaired patients 
from yards and housing units to triage and ambulance loading. Consider 
distances, modes of transport, vehicle access. 
37. Plan to move non-ambulatory inmates  
38. Helipad loading. Develop procedures for moving patients to helipad. 
39. Patient tracking. Develop tracking and reporting procedures to maintain 
accountability of both inmate patients and staff.  
40. Standardized triage method. Establish in policy and staff training plans a 
standardized triage method. Consult with local fire and EMS and consider 
adopting local or regional triage standards.  
41. MCI medical equipment. Determine requirements and maintain sufficient 
types and quantities of medical supplies appropriate for the facility’s size 
and population. Establish these minimums in policy.  
42. Stock common supplies such as colored tarps, triage tags, and other 
supplies as per the adopted triage method. 
43. Develop a cache of MCI medical supplies to include a surplus of 
backboards and braces.  
44. Medical staff as responders. Review medical staff’s current emergency 
response role.  
45. Alarm response. Consider adding medical responders to alarm response 
procedures; stage with medical bags and backboards in anticipation of 
follow-on medical response. 
46. Joint training. Train medical staff jointly with custody staff.  
47. Medical surge. Plan to accommodate the surge of post-incident patients 
over the next 12–24 hours.  
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48. Staffing. Emergency plans to include Develop a plan to evaluate staffing 
needs  
49. Credentialing and privileging of outside medical providers. Develop 
agreements with local medical providers in advance, or establish a process 
to quickly credential and privilege outside medical personnel. 
50. Test procedures annually with a full-scale exercise 
The results of the Delphi panel indicate consensus with no dissenting opinions. 
More so, the panel expressed an interest in implementation and voiced concerns about 
overcoming department culture to adopt new tactics and supporting training. While those 
are topics for another day and another thesis, the results of this Delphi method validated 
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IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This thesis asks, “How can a framework be developed that will improve prison 
mass-casualty planning and response?” 
Despite the existence of a mature system of doctrinal theory and structures to both 
guide the emergency management discipline at large and facilitate the rapid integration of 
responders from fire, law enforcement, EMS, and other disciplines, the corrections 
enterprise has somehow remained mindfully absent from these planning efforts. While 
some within the emergency management community may assume prisons are somehow 
immune from the effects of major disasters, in reality this lack of inclusion and failing to 
plan often results in the prison becoming its own disaster.208 Several authors have 
demonstrated this emergency planning and preparedness gap to be a systemic rather than 
localized problem, potentially threatening an at-risk population of millions as well as 
risking the safety of the communities in which these facilities reside.  
Of the many potential emergency scenarios that a prison or jail may face, MCIs are 
especially daunting. The challenges of overcoming a sudden surge of serious or life-
threatening injuries while managing waves of outside first responders descending upon the 
facility, operationally restrained by ongoing violence, restricted site access, and the 
inability to communicate are further magnified by the aforementioned lack of planning and 
preparedness. Prior authors have suggested additional governance and federal oversight as 
one potential solution for discipline-specific guidance. However, limited data sources on 
prison incidents and the absence of corrections-specific doctrine often leaves correctional 
emergency planners with little direction for how to achieve desired performance outcomes 
or even what those outcomes should be. Federal Homeland Security agencies, such as the 
U.S. Fire Administration, have spearheaded the development of doctrinal planning 
guidance for the fire services and emergency medical disciplines while the corrections 
enterprise has no such federal counterpart. Making available corrections-specific planning 
                                                 
208 Savilonis, “Prisons and Disasters,” 14, 25. 
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tools such as an MCI planning framework is a critical first step toward bridging the prison 
emergency planning gap.  
A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
An accurate depiction of the problem space is critical when developing an 
emergency-planning product such as a plan or framework. In the absence of sufficient 
prison-related data, the desired performance outcomes and lessons-learned data from non-
prison MCI events can be applied to the correctional operational environment to create a 
theoretical model. Employing a wargaming exercise with subject matter experts to gain 
their feedback and validate the accuracy of the model yields a list of correctional-planning 
issues that forms a prison MCI planning framework. The research and exercises that led to 
this outcome also produced several notable observations. 
First, the gap in doctrine only tells part of the story. The limited-availability 
correctional emergency management doctrine and incident documentation, when coupled 
with the lack of a strong, government advocate to lead the development of such doctrine, 
does in fact leave open a large doctrinal void with little to guide the corrections enterprise. 
The lessons learned documents published in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks suggested the 
need for a national system to unify emergency planning and response across disciplines. 
NIMS is not a plan; it provides the high-level concepts that guides strategic and operational 
planning across the homeland security enterprise, while ICS provides the methods and 
frameworks for operational and tactical-level response. The universal theme of “function 
jointly to build response capability” echoes throughout these documents with the 
expectation that response agencies will gain an understanding of their partner agencies, 
reflected in their own policies, procedures, and tactics. Similarly, it is incumbent upon 
correctional emergency managers to apply this doctrine to the operational environment 
with input from local planning partners. The planning gap experienced by the corrections 
enterprise may actually stem from a lack of understanding of the problem space.  
In the Boston Marathon example, the Boston planners developed a deep 
understanding of the problem space by reviewing information such as after actions reports 
from previous marathon events, and testing their assumptions in multiagency wargaming 
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exercises. The successful mass-casualty response and manhunt that followed required 
multiple response agencies at the local, state, and federal levels with the ability to 
communicate and coordinate response actions. One can only imagine the tragic outcomes 
that could have occurred if each of these participating agencies had developed a response 
plan without coordinating information from their partner agencies. Boston should not be 
viewed as an exceptional outcome, but rather the standard that NIMS was intended to 
achieve.  
Conversely, correctional emergency managers may simply not know just how 
much they do not know having functioned in a sort of planning vacuum for so long. In the 
course of their research, authors Savilonis and Robbins documented the lack of planning 
and preparedness for major disasters across the correctional enterprise and the often-tragic 
outcomes that result when major disasters strike. While Robbins was primarily concerned 
about protecting the rights of this vulnerable group (prisoners), and Savilonis made the 
case for additional governance, neither specifically identified the root cause of this 
planning gap, leaving open the potential for future research. Correctional facilities will 
likely have some form of an emergency plan or a series of documented emergency 
procedures; however, the actual extent of those plans can vary widely and may not account 
for a major crisis such as an evacuation or an MCI. The expert panel participating in the 
modified Delphi process initially expressed confidence in their organization’s ability to 
handle a major incident. As the exercise progressed, presenting the panel with additional 
details based on gaps found in the research, that confidence was somewhat replaced with 
concern; they agreed their facilities were not fully prepared for the scenario as presented. 
The initial interpretation was misread as a planning gap that could be simply overcome 
through more thorough planning activities. However, with several prisons represented by 
the panel, it was evident they all had approximately the same level or lack of preparedness 
for the issues at hand. When presented with the true nature of these planning issues and the 
panel members understood the problem, they easily worked out viable solution. More 
planning does not necessarily equate to proper planning; a thorough understanding of the 
problem space is clearly a critical element of developing a viable emergency plan.  
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Second, the outcomes of this research reinforce the validity of the use of wargaming 
and exercises as planning tools. While exercising emergency plans is recommended in 
doctrine, the Boston Marathon by itself stands as a testament to wargaming as a method of 
testing facts, challenging assumptions, and resolving operational problems.209 
Additionally, this researcher’s personal experience with the use of wargaming, both as a 
military staff officer and as a homeland security exercise planner, certainly provided some 
personal bias as to the efficacy of this tool for developing a well-scripted response. In 
developing the MCI framework, it would have been far easier to present each subject matter 
expert with a survey or other tool via email to validate the importance of the proposed 
framework issues and gather their individual comments on the existence of critical 
planning gaps. However, doing so would have produced results tepid at best, further 
reinforcing the problems of planning without a clear understanding of the problem space. 
The wargaming venue instead allowed them to build on one another’s ideas, triggering 
memories of past emergencies, and reaching back into their collective experiences to 
produce a product with a far greater level of detail. This forum also revealed additional 
critical planning issues tangential to those initially presented that a simple survey or 
interview might not have yielded. Replicating this type of active engagement is a critical 
step in testing assumptions and refining emergency plans. At the conclusion of the 
modified Delphi process, the panel reviewing the results of the exercise collectively agreed 
that the proposed prison mass-casualty planning framework is an applicable and useful tool 
that correctly identifies planning gaps that they now recognize exists within their own 
facilities. This experience further highlights the issue of understanding the problem space. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS  
Without adequate emergency plans or active engagement with the response 
community, prisons are more akin to a public safety customer than a response partner, 
which creates multiple vulnerabilities. Therefore, prisons must take an active role in their 
own emergency preparedness, engage their public safety partners, and graduate from 
                                                 
209 Department of Homeland Security, National Preparedness Goal, 13. 
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customer to participating member of the emergency management community. The 
following recommendations provide additional organizational and tactical guidance that 
may be useful in the implementation of the prison MCI framework. Central to these 
recommendations is the adoption of NIMS, as this is the strategic-level guidance provided 
by the federal government for all emergency response organizations. 
1. Adopt NIMS as official policy. A correctional agency’s formal 
promulgation of NIMS as official policy is a critical first step, initiating 
their membership with the emergency management discipline. 
2. Adopt the whole community approach. In preparation for what will 
inevitably be a multi-agency, multi-discipline crisis, organizational 
changes should begin with adopting the whole community approach 
prescribed in NIMS. Prison emergency managers should initiate those 
outreach and planning discussions with local response partners such as 
EMS providers, fire, law enforcement, and county and state emergency 
services agencies to discuss capability building and initiate joint planning 
discussions. Touring the prison and discussing issues such as ingress and 
egress routes, patient loading areas, and physical space requirements for 
emergency vehicle staging allow these response agencies an opportunity 
to help identify potential shortcomings and assist the prison with 
developing solutions early in the planning process. These initial meetings 
may lead to additional working groups to discuss issues such as 
communications interoperability, equipment standards, and even response 
tactics. For example, both FEMA and the expert panel recommended 
adopting a standardized triage method. Adopting the same method used by 
outside medical responders can create a mutual aid relationship that 
potentially allows these responders to augment prison medical staff and 
assist with patient triage.  
3. Develop an understanding of patient thresholds. These joint planning 
activities will also assist correctional emergency managers with 
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developing an understanding of patient thresholds, communicating or 
declaring an MCI, hospital notifications, and other factors that may 
automatically trigger the deployment of additional regional medical 
resources. Documenting details such as response times and the mutual aid 
request process to access regional MCI response resources is critical to 
local planning.210 While smaller EMS systems might be less likely to own 
a cache of medical supplies or an MCI trailer, major metropolitan regions 
such as San Francisco, for example, have invested in an MCI bus capable 
of transporting 22 patients.211 While this is an exceptional resource 
example, the existence of any resource is a moot point if neighboring 
jurisdictions are unaware that they exist or lack the necessary agreements 
or processes to request these resources when needed.  
4. Mark ingress and egress routes and install signage to direct 
emergency vehicles to designated locations. When those requested 
resources do arrive, the facility must be prepared to receive, stage, and 
integrate them into the prison’s ICS organization. Larger facilities 
especially should consider marking the ingress and egress routes and 
installing signage to direct arriving emergency vehicles to designated 
locations such as the staging area and the patient loading area.  
5. Pre-identify specific prison positions appropriate for ICS roles. 
Operationalizing emergency procedures as part of the prison’s day-to-day 
routine shifts these responsibilities away from the incident commander 
and assigns them to staff as immediate response actions. Staff can be pre-
identified to assume these emergency response roles as well. Identifying 
staff for deployment and assigning them to ICS positions is typically a 
                                                 
210 Heightman, “10 Tips to Help Gear Up for MCIs,” 4; Federal Emergency Management Agency, 
National Incident Management System, 12. 
211 Eli Wirtschafter, “Disaster Prep, SF-Style: Giant Ambulances Built from Old Muni Buses,” 




tactical decision managed by the incident commander at the time of the 
incident; however, this represents another opportunity to operationalize 
emergency response procedures. The expert panel expressed an interest in 
the concept of pre-identifying specific prison positions appropriate for pre-
designating certain ICS roles. When the prison activates their ICS 
organization, these personnel automatically deploy in their designated ICS 
roles to oversee those tasks that historically create problems such as site 
management and vehicle flow. Wherever possible, plans should identify 
positions within the prison that have a clear linkage between the day-to-
day duties and the ICS position duties. For example, a logistics manager 
that oversees warehousing and receiving might be an ideal fit to assume 
the role of staging area manager. This allows for responding staff to be 
specifically trained for these roles in advance of the incident, and resolves 
many issues associated with site management. 
6. Develop plans for patient movement and adopt new tactics to 
integrate medical responders into prison alarm response procedures. 
In addition to operationalizing these response elements, the framework 
also recommends agencies develop plans for patient movement and 
consider adopting new tactics that integrate medical responders into alarm 
response procedures. Prison MCI response often begins with disturbance 
control measures, later followed by the mobilization of internal medical 
personnel to perform first aid. 
7. Enact disturbance control procedures that include automatic 
deployment and pre-staging of prison staff and develop procedures 
for rapidly transitioning to emergency response operations. The expert 
panel recommended disturbance control procedures should include the 
automatic deployment and pre-staging of prison medical staff and 
developing procedures for rapidly transitioning to emergency medical 
response operations. Recommendations for supplementing this tactic 
includes the pre-positioning of medical bags, backboards, and MCI kits 
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with triage tags and colored tarps, as required by local triage methods. 
This rapid deployment tactic speeds the transition to medical response and 
establishes the triage area in anticipation of receiving patients. Including 
medical staff in the planning and early deployment also provides a lead-in 
to the patient movement plan.  
8. Develop a tactical plan for patient movement. Developing a tactical 
plan for patient movement is itself a major planning exercise, and another 
key opportunity for prison staff to work out solutions through wargaming. 
Larger facilities with interior corridors that restrict vehicle access and 
movement will need to develop local best practices for transporting 
multiple non-ambulatory inmates, taking into account the locations of 
triage areas and ambulance loading sites. Prisons serviced by air 
ambulance providers must plan for even longer transport distances, as both 
designated and emergency helipads will likely be located far from fixed 
structures and overhead utility lines, and in some cases beyond parking 
areas. A logistics plan to support patient movement should also be 
considered, factoring in sufficient quantities of backboards and gurneys to 
keep on hand, their appropriate storage locations for rapid access 
deployment, and even identifying additional staff to facilitate this 
movement to the triage area.  
9. Designate a gymnasium or other indoor space for patient triage. 
Finally, designating a gymnasium or other indoor space for patient triage, 
as opposed to the prison yard, removes the patients and staff from the 
immediate danger of an active incident as well as inclement weather. It is 
also advisable to separate the opposing groups of inmates into two triage 
areas, despite the strain this places on medical staff. Remediating this 
potential staffing shortage by selecting a triage area accessible to outside 
medical responders, or developing procedures and mutual aid agreements 
to bring those responders inside the facility are options to be considered 
when wargaming and developing local tactics.  
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C. IN CLOSING 
Most, if not all, of the lessons learned documents reviewed for this thesis involve 
emergency response agencies that in theory were very likely to have adopted NIMS early 
rather than later. When responding to an incident, the responders arrive to an often-
unfamiliar location and do their best to overcome unexpected operational challenges and 
evolving threats. In the rush to save lives, mitigate suffering, and protect property, and 
despite their collective training and experience, they inevitably overlook critical details 
involving doctrine or tactics. Even skilled professionals sometimes get it wrong.  
As several authors have demonstrated, the corrections enterprise lacks this 
experience and has a long way to go in order to keep pace with its local partner agencies. 
However, as permanent, fixed locations, correctional facilities have the clear advantage of 
time; rather than rely entirely on the “just in time” features of ICS, these facilities have the 
ability to mirror the successes of incidents such as the Boston Marathon and pre-script their 
next disasters. Achieving this level of preparedness in the absence is no simple task. At the 
very least, the application of this framework can help these correctional organizations 
jump-start their MCI planning. In the long term, this will inevitably expose them to more 
elements of the doctrine and potentially lead to a doctrinally compliant system of policies, 
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APPENDIX A. SURVEY QUESTIONS 
Thank you for your participation in this survey. Your individual responses are entirely 
confidential and will not be associated with any personally identifiable information; they 
will be merged with other participant’s responses in order to identify general trends and 
beliefs about CDCR’s planning and response. This is first of three research activities that 
will be used to improve mass casualty planning. Please be as complete as possible, you 
may attach additional sheets if necessary.  




Background: In 2009 CDCR experienced a major incident at a Southern California 
facility that involved nearly 1,200 inmates, resulting in 9 staff injuries and 249 inmate 
injuries; 54 inmates were transported to local hospitals. 7 buildings were damaged by 
fire and rioting inmates, and over a dozen local agencies responded.  
 
Possible discussion points to consider when answering the questions below: 
Alarm response Communications 
Mass casualty response  Management of medical emergencies 
Medical staff Unified Command post 
Incident management Incident command system (ICS) 
Integration with outside first responders Resource staging 
 
1. If your local institution were to experience a major, mass-casualty producing 
incident today, similar in size and scope to the 2009 incident, do you feel that 




2. Please describe any joint planning activities you have participated in with local 
first responders, or any other emergency preparedness activities have you been a 
part of in the last 12 months: 
 
 
3. If your local institution experienced an event like the one described above, please 
briefly describe the areas or issues that in your opinion would go well? 
 
 
4. Can you briefly describe the areas or issues that in your opinion would require 
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APPENDIX B. TABLETOP EXERCISE 
Emergency Planning & Management Unit 
and 
The Center for Homeland Defense and Security, 
US Naval Postgraduate School 
Prison Mass Casualty Incident Planning 







Mass casualty incidents (MCI) can occur quickly and without warning, straining a 
community’s ability to respond and provide emergency medical care. The mission of 
medical first responders quickly shifts from doing the greatest good for the individual 
patient to doing the greatest good for the greatest number of people. Improperly managed 
and the crisis can spread from the incident site to the treatment site as hospitals become 
overwhelmed with the sudden surge in patients.  
Some would argue that a prison mass casualty incident is no different from any other MCI. 
Modern office buildings, high-rise structures, and school campuses may have increased 
security measures in place that restrict movement and public access, measures that may 
appear prison-like to the uninitiated. In reality, a prison’s multiple layers of physical 
security, restricted access by even first responders, and especially the safety issues 
inherent in interacting with dangerous convicted felons add additional levels of complexity 
to an already chaotic and complex incident.  
The 2009 California Institution for Men incident occurred in a city with a large population 
center and a robust emergency medical response, and yet it stretched the capabilities of 
CDCR and the twelve outside agencies that responded. Had this occurred in one of the 
many other prisons located in a remote community with significantly less medical 
resources, the outcome might have been much different.  
By its very nature an MCI will instantly become a multi-agency response, requiring the 
coordination of fire, EMS, and possibly even local law enforcement in concert with the 
affected prison. A whole-community approach to training can mean the difference between 
a well-orchestrated response and a scene that deteriorates into further chaos. Your 
participation is tangible evidence of CDCR’s commitment to ensure public safety through 
collaborative partnerships that will prepare it to respond to any emergency.  
The information obtained from today’s exercise will be used to significantly improve public 
safety through the development of a prison mass casualty planning framework applicable 
to any jail or prison facility. 
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Schedule / Agenda 
 
8:00 – 8:30 a.m. Welcome, Introductions,  
Research In-Brief 
 
8:30 – 10:00 a.m. Module I – Notification and Initial 
Response 
 Scenario, Questions, and 
Solutions 
 
10:00 – 10:15 a.m. Break 
 
10:15 – 12:00 p.m. Module II – Unified Command 
 Scenario, Questions, and 
Solutions     
12:00 – 1:00 p.m. Lunch Break 
 
 1:00 – 1:45 p.m. Module III – Resource Reception 
and Staging 
 Scenario, Questions, and 
Solutions 
  
1:45 – 2:00 p.m. Break 
 
2:00 – 3:00 p.m. Module IV – Patient Triage, 
Extraction, and Other Issues 
 Scenario, Questions, and 
Solutions 
 














While most incidents of inmate violence are limited to relatively small skirmishes that end 
as quickly as they begin, these events can escalate in a matter of seconds. In 2009 a riot 
erupted at the California Institution for Men in Chino, California. What started as a small 
fight between several inmates quickly spread across the prison as more inmates joined 
the battle. Over the next several hours, correctional officers would attempt to regain control 
as buildings burned and over a dozen outside agencies responded. With over 1,100 
inmates involved in the riot and several buildings on fire, responding firefighters refused 
to enter until the prison was secured, allowing the structures to burn uncontrolled while a 
plan was formulated. Recognizing that the incident would not be stabilized soon, fire 
fighters sprayed water on several burning buildings from outside the secured perimeter. 
Meanwhile, rescue operations were mounted to locate staff that had barricaded 
themselves inside their offices as protection from the rioting inmates.  
Normally a triage area would be established on the yard to quickly identify, stabilize, and 
move the more critical cases to ambulances outside the prison. Less critical cases are 
treated in a small prison clinic which on this day was quickly becoming overwhelmed. As 
injured inmates were removed from the fray, the medical staff were limited in their ability 
to safely triage and sort the wounded this close to the chaos of the riot still in progress. 
They had seen their share of inmate violence, but never before had they experienced a 
prolonged incident with so many serious injuries. With no safe location to triage and treat 
a growing number of injuries, the decision was made to relocate the injured inmates 
outside of the secure perimeter and establish a triage area in the prison parking lot. This 
would allow the local first responders to assist with triage.  
When the incident finally ended, 185 inmates were treated on site and 54 were transported 
to local hospitals for treatment. Although there were several critical injuries, there were no 
inmate fatalities.  
While this was the likely the worst incident in CDCR history, it was not the department’s 
last MCI event. The Emergency Planning and Management Unit, with the United States 
Naval Postgraduate School Center for Homeland Defense and Security, has embarked 
on an ambitious project to develop an MCI planning framework applicable to any prison 
or jail facility.  
An analysis of mass casualty literature from a variety of sources to include FEMA planning 
documents, mass casualty and active shooter after actions reports, professional journals, 
and CDCR incidents revealed numerous common issues that are likely to occur during 
MCI events. By anticipating these shortfalls and developing solutions specific to each 
institution, we can “pre-script” our incident response and overcome these common 
failures. 
Purpose 
The purpose of this exercise is to validate these unanticipated problems and develop 
solutions and policy recommendations. The information collected today contributes to 
research being conducted under the supervision of the Center for Homeland Defense and 




The institution presented in this scenario serves as the backdrop for discussion; however, 
this exercise is not specific to a particular institution. Emphasis for this exercise is on 
improving agency coordination, identifying conflicting policies, integrating capabilities, and 
resolving known roadblocks to MCI response. Developing solutions to the identified 
problems are more important than finite details of the scenario.  
Exercise Structure 
The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation Prison Mass Casualty 
Planning Strategic Exercise is an interactive facilitated exercise. Participants will respond 
to the following three distinct modules: 
 
• Module I Notification and Initial Response 
• Module II Unified Command 
• Module III Resource Reception and Staging 




• Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) serve as the exercise ‘players’ who will 
respond to the situation based on their experience, training, and knowledge. 
SMEs are encouraged to participate in the process of making 
recommendations that will improve MCI planning and response.  
• Facilitator lead the discussion and provide situational updates. They also 
provide additional information and resolve questions, as required. 
Assumptions and Artificialities 
A number of assumptions and artificialities may be necessary to complete the scenario in 
the time allotted, or in order to evoke a specific discussion. During this exercise, the 
following apply: 
• The scenario is plausible and events occur as they are presented. 
• There are no “hidden agendas” or trick questions. 
• All SMEs/players receive information at the same time. 
Exercise Guidelines / Participant Briefing 
There is no set solution! Varying and different viewpoints are expected. This is intended 
to be a safe, open, stress-free environment. Participants should be all be aware of the 
following: 
• Your participation is voluntary. 
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• We will be discussing emergency situations that some may find stressful; if 
you feel this exercise will cause you stress or discomfort, or at any time you 
begin to feel anxiety you may be excused from further participation. 
• Your responses are being documented for research purposes and may be 
used to develop solutions that will improve MCI planning and response. 
• There will be no audio or video recording. 
• Photography of the participants is not allowed.  
• Your responses will be anonymized and not attributed to you.  
• No identifying information will be maintained after this exercise. 
• Participants are asked to respect participant anonymity and not discuss the 
materials or participant responses outside of the exercise.  
• Your position or your organization’s policies do not limit you. Give your 
professional recommendation or make your best decision based on the 
circumstances presented. 
• Decisions are not precedent-setting and may not reflect your organization’s 
final position on a given issue. This is an opportunity to discuss and present 
multiple options and possible solutions. 
• Assume cooperation and support from other responders, agencies and the 
private sector. 
• The situation updates, written materials and resources serve as the basis for 
this discussion, but you are not limited in the source of documentation you can 
use to develop your recommendations. It is asked that you credit any sources 




Module 1: Notification and Initial Response 
California State Prison, Sacramento (CSP-SAC) is a Level IV institution situated on 882 
acres in Folsom, California. It has twenty-four (180 design) housing units and an 
administrative segregation unit. Like most of CDCR, is it also surrounded by a lethal 
electrified fence.  
Over the last few months, tensions on Facility B (Level IV General Population) yard have 
been steadily increasing between two inmate groups. Two violent assaults have recently 
occurred, and Institutional Gang Investigators have warned of the high potential for 
retaliatory attacks. A full lock-down of the yard is being considered until the tension issues 
have been identified and resolved.  
Late Saturday afternoon, just prior to dinner recall, a fight between inmates from two 
different housing units erupts, quickly escalates, and spills out onto the yard area as more 
inmates join the fight. An alarm is sounded and a Code 3 Response is requested. As 
officers attempt to gain control, additional skirmishes break out in several housing units. 
Inmates clog toilets, burn mattresses, and vandalize anything and everything. Control 
Booth Officers quickly exhaust their less lethal ammunition. 
Staff attempt to establish skirmish lines and begin rescuing staff and injured inmates. 
Adjoining facilities had already released for the evening meal and are adjusting to provide 
support.  
As institutional inmate fire crews (per Department Operations Manual) cannot respond to 
a disturbance, Folsom Fire Department has been dispatched. Upon their arrival, FFD 
observes that an active riot is still in progress and refuses to enter a chaotic and unsecured 
yard. They proceed to stage outside the secured perimeter while waiting for assurances 
that the incident is stabilized and secure enough for firefighters to enter. The Fire Captain 





Based on the information provided in Module 1, please answer the following questions. 
These questions are not meant to constitute a definitive list of concerns to be addressed; 
based on your expertise, please share any additional requirements, critical issues, and 
decisions that should be addressed at this time.  
 
1. What notifications occur (WHO is notified?) and HOW are they 
communicated? (radio, phone, emails?) 
2. How is emergency medical aid requested? 911 or direct call to local 
EMS system? Who makes that call?  
3. Is there a policy, or procedure that requires 911 instead of directly 
contacting local EMS? Has that been an issue? 
4. What are the initial actions when a major disturbance occurs? 
(Walk-through alarm response procedures) 
5. Does your medical staff participate in the alarm response? 
6. How are medical staff equipped and trained for alarm response?  
7. Are vehicles such as ambulances and fire engines escorted inside? 
(How do they find their way around unfamiliar facilities?)  
8. Does your Department follow ICS? 
9. Do staff wear ICS vests or other method of identification to outside 
agencies? 
10. Do you conduct position-specific ICS training? 
11. What is the threshold for an MCI in your area?  
12. Who declares an MCI? 





Module 2: Unified Command 
It becomes clear that this incident has escalated significantly and has or will exceed the 
prison’s ability to respond. Inmates are causing widespread damage and starting 
additional fires. Smoke is billowing out of two housing units and there are small fires on 
the yard. Many inmate identification cards were lost or destroyed and mattresses burned. 
Several shots have been fired in the vicinity of the riot and at least one inmate may have 
been killed, but reports are conflicting at this time. Activation of the CDCR Department 
Operations Center has been initiated by the Emergency Planning and Management Unit 
to coordinate additional state resources. 
Responding local law enforcement agencies includes the California Highway Patrol, 
Sacramento County Sheriff’s Office, Folsom Police Department, and a coordinator from 
the Cal-OES Law Branch. Folsom Fire and several other fire and EMS agencies are 









Based on the information provided in Module 2, please answer the following questions. 
These questions are not meant to constitute a definitive list of concerns to be addressed; 
based on your expertise, please share any additional requirements, critical issues, and 
decisions that should be addressed at this time. 
1. How is unified command established with outside responders? 
2. Where is your command post located?  
3. Is it accessible by outside agencies? 
4. Is it large enough to accommodate multiple agencies? 
5. Does the command post have sufficient communication lines to 




Module 3: Resource Reception and Staging 
A television news van has already arrived at the front gate, having redirected from their 
planned appearance at a nearby park; a helicopter is also circling the facility, but in the 
developing darkness it is impossible to tell if it is news media, law enforcement, or air 
ambulance. The PIO responded by cell phone, he was at home when the incident started 
but is currently driving back to the institution and should arrive in the next 20 minutes. 
Additional news crews can be expected at any moment  
Fire trucks, ambulances, and CDCR vehicles are crowding the parking lot and starting to 
block roads. Many of these ambulance and fire truck operators have never been to the 
prison before and there is some confusion on where to go. 






Based on the information provided in Module 3, please answer the following questions. 
For any negative responses, discuss potential solutions. These questions are not meant 
to constitute a definitive list of concerns to be addressed; based on your expertise, please 
share any additional requirements, critical issues, and decisions that should be addressed 
at this time. 
1. How are incoming resources received, staged, and integrated in the 
response? 
2. Does your institution have a designated (emergency vehicle and 
resource) staging area? If not, where would you establish a staging 
area? 
3. Is there a designated Staging Area Manager? 
4. Are emergency vehicle ingress and egress routes identified? 
5. What is the policy for inmate transport coverage? (1 officer per 
inmate/ambulance?) During a major disturbance and/or MCI, does 
this affect the prison’s ability to respond?  
6. Does the institution have an established helipad? Or designated 
landing area? 
7. How do you communicate with life-flight? 
8. How do you transport patients to helipad?  
9. Do officers travel on life-flight? 
10. What is the travel time or turn-around time for a life-flight? 
11. How are patients tracked? 
12. Does the institution maintain a cache of medical supplies and 
backboards sufficient to handle an MCI event? 
13. How does the institution receive on-site news media? Is there a 
designated media staging area?  
14. Where does the PIO hold press conferences? 




Module 4: Patient Triage, Extraction, and Other Issues 
Medical staff had initially established a triage area on the yard expecting the incident to 
quickly subside, however the level of violence and number of injured have caused them 
to reconsider. Their initial estimate is six inmates will require hospitalization; another 10 
will need immediate transport and treatment; 15 more are being considered for transport. 
The injuries of approximately 50 inmates are minor enough to be treated on-site, but 
resources are stretched thin and they cannot be seen right away. Injuries generally range 
from smoke inhalation to blunt-force trauma and cuts. It is now confirmed that there are 2 
inmate fatalities, and third is expected to expire in the triage area.  
The medical clinic was not designed for a patient surge of this magnitude. Medical staff 










Based on the information provided in Module 4, please answer the following questions. 
For any negative responses, discuss potential solutions. These questions are not meant 
to constitute a definitive list of concerns to be addressed; based on your expertise, please 
share any additional requirements, critical issues, and decisions that should be addressed 
at this time. 
Triage: 
1. What triage method is used (SALT, DIME, etc.)? Is this department-
wide policy? 
2. Is there a designated triage area, or policy for determining triage 
location if clinic is not feasible? 
3. Does this conflict with vehicle staging or prison security 
procedures? 
4. Can outside responders come inside the secured perimeter to 
assist with triage? 
Extraction: 
5. How are non-ambulatory patients moved from areas inaccessible to 
emergency vehicles?  
Fatality Management: 
6. How are fatalities handled? 
7. When is the Coroner contacted? Who contacts the Coroner?  
Communications: 
8. How are frequencies and radio communications managed? 
9. Are you able to communicate by radio with local responders? 
10. Are there known communications gaps or “dead zones” in your 
facility?  
Joint Training and Planning: 
11. Do you train / plan jointly with local response partners/agencies? 
12. Are these other agencies familiar with your procedures for facility 
access and response? 
13. Are CDCR/institution staff familiar with their own plans? 
14. Are you familiar with local resources that are available to your 
facility? Specifically, law enforcement and medical (related to MCI) 
Medical Surge: 
15. Does the institution have a plan to handle the post-incident medical 
surge? 
16. Is there a method of credentialing outside medical staff?  
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